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Abstract
Buyer behavior for procuring large, complex, customized items consists of initial phases
where firms first specify the needed item(s) and pre-qualify vendors, following which an
auction is used to choose the contractor. Despite the rigid rules and detailed specifica-
tions accompanying auctions, it is striking that procurement auctions in industries like
information technology (IT) display very large differences between the initially agreed-to
payment and the actual payments because of revisions negotiated during the execution
phase. However, these revisions are ignored in the theoretical and empirical auction lit-
erature. After developing a mathematical model to specify how bidders accommodate
post-auction modifications, I develop a method to take my model to a comprehensive
dataset of IT procurement auctions.
I find that the prospects of modifications lower bidders' latent costs, leading to
more aggressive bids, especially by bidders without a previous contract with the buyer.
To fix the magnitude of this effect, I consider a buyer who credibly commits to a no-
modification policy, and find that such a commitment would increase bids by 27%, all
else is equal. I also find that the size of this shadow of the future is larger for lump-sum
bids. To fix this magnitude, I consider a buyer who switches the auction bid format
from a lump-sum bid to a more flexible bid format (e.g., time and materials), and find
that bids are lower by 16%, all else being equal. These large effects form the basis
of my recommendations for improving procurement auctions. They also contribute to
long-standing theory concerns studied in transaction cost economics.
My findings support the Williamsonian critique of procurement auctions as a solution
for the ex-post monopoly problem; my estimates demonstrate that ex post modifications
remain an intrinsic aspect of procurement auctions. However, auctions remain a valu-
able procurement device for customized goods in complex, fast-moving environments,
particularly when used with more flexible payment formats.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
An important, and growing aspect of modern economies concerns the procurement of
costly, customized goods and services by private and public enterprises. Pharmaceuti-
cals, electronics and autos are all prominent instances of industries where procurement
is prominent; perhaps the most visible sector in this regard is information technology
(IT). One estimate is that global expenditure in IT services outsourcing was $952 billion
in 2013, and it is expected to exceed $1,000 billion starting from 2014 (KPMG, 2013).
Marketing scholars (e.g., Webster and Wind, 1972) have described the organiza-
tional buying (procurement) processes across different circumstances. For repetitive,
small-ticket items, the process is simple. Even large-ticket item procurement becomes
routinized over time because suppliers manufacture multiple units of the identical piece
of equipment. The most complex, and non-routine procurement processes involve cus-
tomized products and services. Here, there is no pre-existing market of suppliers offering
competing products. Instead, would-be suppliers must be engaged to create the cus-
tomized product. Here, the first major stage of procurement consists of the buyer’s
efforts to translate the needs into a set of product requirements. 1 This stage includes
extensive interactions with possible suppliers, often referred to as requests for informa-
tion (RFI). In the next stage, the buyer winnows down the original list of contacts to a
much smaller list of qualified vendors. At the same time, a package of documents spec-
ifying the design and scope of work, timelines, etc. is created and the buyer formulates
1 To minimize repetition, I shall use product to refer to both products and services.
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2requests for proposals (RFP) or requests for quotes (RFQ) to be sent to the qualified
vendor list.
At this point, a very significant decision is made about the manner in which the win-
ning supplier will be selected: negotiations versus auctions. Under negotiations (also
known as pitches or beauty contests) with potential suppliers, the selection process is
not transparent to third parties, as the buyer does not disclose the scoring rules or
other formula used to evaluate suppliers’ proposals. Negotiations almost always pro-
ceed sequentially, beginning with the most promising qualified vendor, and moving on
to the next qualified vendor in case of a breakdown. The second approach is a pro-
curement auction (also called a reverse auction). Here, the buyer sends the developed
product specifications as an RFP or RFQ to the short list of qualified vendors, and
invites them to enter a bid. The bid scoring rule is always disclosed, and in the case of
public enterprises, they are legally bound to follow the disclosed formula for choosing
the winner. In contrast to sequential negotiations, procurement auctions involve all the
invited vendors simultaneously. While many auction types exist (e.g., ascending, de-
scending, open-outcry, sealed bid, first price, second price, etc.), procurement auctions
for customized industrial products and services resemble a sealed bid, first-price auction.
Auctions are considered superior to negotiations (e.g., Bulow and Klemperer, 1994a)
because competition between bidders drives down prices, even when the product is cus-
tomized to the buyer. They are also fairer and less susceptible to corruption, so the
public sector often mandates auctions. 2 Over the last twenty years, there has been
an upsurge in private sector procurement auctions, including e-sourcing supported by
the growth of online auction tools. However, there is a small, but longstanding stream
of scholarly work in transaction cost economics (e.g., Goldberg, 1977) highlighting the
drawbacks of procurement auctions. The informal argument is that customized product
specifications inevitably contain gaps that present themselves during execution, which
exposes the buyer and winning bidder to opportunistic bargaining over the initial terms.
In other words, the supposed benefits of auctions over negotiations might be dissipated
2 For instance, the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) requires full and open competition in
government procurements (41 U.S.C. sect. 253a(a) (1) (A) (2000)).
3given these incompleteness problems. These arguments notwithstanding, we see large,
complex, customized products in technically sophisticated settings such as information
technology (IT) being procured increasingly via auctions (e.g., IDC 2013).
Real-world IT procurement auctions differ from the formal auction models in a cru-
cial way: large differences are very commonly observed between the initially agreed-to
terms of work and bids versus the final payments. Given the pace of IT advancements,
it is not surprising that newer technologies, software tools, and industry standards be-
come available during the execution phase. It is in the interest of the buyer to adapt to
these newer, better technologies. While best-efforts and industry-practice clauses allow
relatively small adjustments to agreed-upon auction terms, significant changes require
new contracts to replace the winning bid. Indeed, in the database of IT procurement
transactions (IDC, 2013) that I employ, the original auction contract is replaced with a
new contract (with the original winner) over 90% of the time. The dollar value of these
modifications range from -10% to +250% of the original bid, and the large majority are
revised upward. 3
Despite the prevalence of such follow-on negotiations with the winner, the formal
auction literature has developed without accommodating this real-world aspect (see Ba-
jari et al., 2014, for a notable exception). Industry observers (e.g., Weigand, 1980) have
long noted that far-sighted bidders fold in these anticipated revisions to buy into the
business; thus, our formal models might grossly under- or over-estimate the efficiency of
auctions over negotiations since these episodes are more properly described as auctions
plus follow-on revisions. In contrast to the formal modeling stream, the transaction cost
and incomplete contracting work predicts the inevitability of these revisions following
auctions. Williamson’s (1976) case analysis of the Oakland cable TV franchise auction
illustrates the gaps that inevitably necessitate revisions for complex, customized prod-
ucts. Both the buyer and supplier are implicated here. The bidder may systematically
3 This phenomenon is not confined to the IT industry. Bajari, Houghton and Tadelis (2014) de-
scribe highway construction bids in California, where a large fraction were subsequently revised during
execution, although the magnitude of revisions was smaller, presumably on account of the slower pace
of technical changes, and the larger fraction of material inputs in construction leading to greater com-
pleteness in the specifications.
4under-bid in order to buy into the business by exploiting the gaps in specifications.
On the other hand, bidders may over-bid to safeguard themselves against opportunistic
revisions by the buyer as proposed and shown by Ghosh and John (2005).
I have two goals for my study. First, I seek to build and estimate a more realistic,
formal model of a procurement auction with follow-on revisions that informs us about
the direction and magnitude of bid skewing. My second goal is to compare the two
most common procurement auction bid formats with respect to the skewing effect; viz.
lump-sum bids versus unit-price bids. Lump-sum bids require bidders to declare one
overall price for the entire project, while unit-price bids require bidders to declare their
itemized price per unit of each specified dimension of work such as hours of labor and/or
lines of code.
1.0.1 Summary of Findings and Contributions
I specify a rational expectations model of far-sighted bidders in a procurement auction,
and derive the optimal bidding solution. I need to estimate this model, particularly
the parameter which captures the direction and degree to which a dollar of anticipated
revisions are folded into the bid. The extant methodology developed by Bajari et al.
(2014) requires that the econometrician observes all the bids across a set of auctions, but
this is almost never available in private-sector auctions. I develop significant extensions
(parametric and non-parametric) to their approach for a setting where one observes
only the winning bid.
My estimates reveal that upward modifications lower bidders' latent costs which
lead to more aggressive bids. In order to quantify this downward pressure on bids, I
consider the following thought experiment. What if modifications were ruled out by the
buyer? This is eminently realistic; indeed, we find public sector buyers are required to
forgo follow-on modifications with the winning bidder. Employing my structural esti-
mates to compute this counterfactual scenario, I find that such a commitment would
cost the buyer dearly because the winning auction bid increases by 27%. To put this
into perspective, the average value of a contract in my sample is worth 135.39 million
5dollars, which means the modification effect is worth 36.55 million dollars on average.
My second research goal concerns the choice of auction payment formats. IT procure-
ment auctions use two payment forms: a lump-sum payment, or a unit-price payment
such as time and materials where bidders specify the price per unit of labor and other
metrics such as KLOC (thousands of lines of code). These unit prices are applied to
the quantities stipulated in the RFP/RFQ documents to arrive at the total payment.
The transaction costs literature (e.g., Goldberg, 1977; Williamson, 1975) asserts that
lump-sum payment terms are relatively harder to modify ex post, which generates much
of the subsequent contract choice literature in this tradition (e.g., Crocker and Masten,
1991). While some analytical work (e.g., Bajari and Tadelis, 2001) supports this intu-
ition, there is no empirical evidence.
I test this assertion with the following thought experiment. What if a buyer switched
from an observed unit-price format to a lump-sum format? Employing my structural
estimates to compute this counterfactual scenario, I find that this switch increases the
winning bid by 16%, i.e., it makes the procured product costlier. For an average con-
tract in my sample, this result suggests that adopting the unit-price format will lead
to a reduction in price of 21.66 million dollars, when compared to an otherwise identi-
cal lump-sum format contract. This is, to my knowledge, the first empirical evidence
supporting the TCE assertion that lump-sum payment terms are harder to modify, and
actually quantifying the magnitude of this difficulty.
Contributions: My work contributes to the practice of procurement. First, nego-
tiations versus auctions is a false dichotomy. Managers contemplating procurement
auctions should accept the inevitability of ex post revisions during the execution phase.
Indeed, although buyers can commit to a no-modification policy, this is unwise; accom-
modating modifications is better for buyers as it lowers bids. Furthermore, unit-price
auction payment formats are actually superior to lump-sum payment formats in their
ability to govern the inevitable ex post modifications, although managerial commentary
often suggests that lump-sum bidding is more competitive.
6I contribute to the transaction cost literature by demonstrating that procurement
auctions for customized, complex projects can accommodate the inevitable revisions
without losing the gain from competition in the bidding phase. Buyers who accommo-
date ex post modifications gain from aggressive buying-in bidding behavior, particularly
with bidders who had not been engaged previously. Thus, I am able to explain the
widespread use of auctions for procuring complex IT projects.
Finally, I contribute to the methodology on the structural estimation of formal auc-
tion models. I develop non-parametric and parametric approaches to estimate bidders'
latent costs for auctions with ex post modifications even when we are only able to ob-
serve the winners bids.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the rele-
vant literature. Chapter 3 summarizes the research context. Chapter 4 introduces the
data and discusses the estimation approach. Chapter 5 presents the empirical results
from the non-parametric estimation. Chapter 6 presents the parametric estimation and
thought experiments. I conclude with suggestions for future research in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Auctions
There is considerable literature in economics on auctions, with a growing emphasis on
empiricism (see Paarsch and Hong (2006) for a review). In this chapter, I selectively
review the theoretical and empirical auction literature. This dissertation focuses on
procurement auctions between firms (empirical contexts and details provided in Chapter
3); therefore, I direct more attention to these matters. I first introduce elementary
theory as used in modeling procurement, and then review the principal empirical findings
from the literature.
2.1.1 Procurement Auctions
An important aspect of modern economies is large transactions between firms, or be-
tween the government and firms,1 for buying complex goods and services, often tailored
specifically for the buyer. Common examples are governments engaging construction
firms to construct highways, and corporate firms outsourcing the management of billing,
customer service, or information systems to specialist vendors. This practice of having
certain job functions done outside a company instead of having an in-house department
or employee handle them is also called outsourcing. In practice, these purchases are of-
ten conducted through auctions, which are called Procurement Auctions. Procurement
1 As much as 10% of US GDP is estimated to be comprised of government procurement
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8auctions are also commonplace in the public sector ranging from traditional public works
projects like road construction to complex military projects. In fact, governments in
many countries mandate or strongly favor auctions for government procurement because
auctions are considered to engender competition, lower prices and promote fairness.
Technically, a procurement auction is an auction, where sellers declare their offering
price (bids) for their product or service, and the “best” bid defined by the auction rules
wins the contest. The details of bid collection and the determination of the winner
varies across different auction formats.
There are many different formats of auctions, but four of them are predominant
and have been extensively studied by academic scholars: English auctions, First-Price
Sealed-Bid auctions (FPSB), Dutch auctions, and Vickrey auctions. These auction for-
mats differ along two principal dimensions: bid collection practices, and winners’ payoff
(Milgrom and Weber, 1982; Paarsch and Hong, 2006).
(1) English Auctions
In an English auction, the auctioneer begins the bidding at some low price and then
bidders will keep raising the price by at least some directed amount until no one else bids
a higher price and the auction is closed (auctioneers shout out going once, going twice,
sold to). In the bidding process, all the bidders will see the movement of the bidding
price, and the bidder with the highest price wins the auction. This oral, ascending-price
auction is called an English auction, and it is the most frequently used auction type in
practice (Paarsch and Hong, 2006).
In a procurement auction, this English format is as follows: the seller (bidder) who
proposes the lowest price wins and receives his submitted price. On-line procurement
auctions typically employ some variation of this format (e.g., see Engelbrecht-Wiggans,
Haruvy and Katok, 2007).
Milgrom and Weber's (1982) Clock Model is the best theoretical summary of this
auction format. A clock is set initially at some minimum (reserve) price (zero in the
absence of a reserve price). Then the price continuously rises, and the bidders decide
whether to continue or to exit. The auction ends when all but one of the bidders drops
9out. Based on these mechanics, the N potential bidders have ordered valuations:
v(N :N) < v(N−1:N) < ... < v(2:N) < v(1:N)
where v(i:N) stands for the i
th highest valuation among all the bidders. Therefore, the
bidder with valuation v(N :N) drops out first, followed by the bidder v(N−1:N). And the
bidder with the highest valuation v(1:N) will be the last bidder and also is the winner
when the second to last bidder with valuation v(2:N) drops out. For this reason, the price
the winner pays will be equal to v(2:N). It is for this reason that English auctions are
also referred to as Second-Price auctions. The equilibrium as bi = vi, i.e., every bidder
bids his true valuation. This simple equilibrium is also advantageous for estimation
purposes.
Applied to procurement auctions, the Clock Model’s setup remains essentially the
same. The N potential sellers have ordered latent costs:
c(N :N) > c(N−1:N) > ... > c(2:N) > c(1:N)
where c(i:N) stands for the i
th lowest latent cost among all the bidders. Therefore, the
bidder with the highest cost c(N :N) drops out first, followed by the bidder c(N−1:N). And
the bidder with the lowest latent cost c(1:N) will be the last bidder and is the winner
when the second to last bidder with cost c(2:N) drops out. Following the same logic,
each bidder’s optimal bidding rule is bi = ci.
(2) First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auctions
In First-Price, Sealed-Bid (FPSB) auctions, the bids are submitted in a sealed en-
velope which cannot be seen by other bidders. The highest bid wins the auction.
FPSB auctions are the classic form of procurement auctions, and remain the go-to
approach, especially in traditional, off-line settings while English auctions are more often
seen in on-line procurement auctions because the latter require the actual presence of
the bidders, which can be very expensive. However, with on-line technology, the bidders
can readily observe each other’s bids without being present in the same auction room
(Milgrom, 1989).
As discussed in Chapter 3, my dissertation uses the FPSB setup to approximate the
procurement auctions in my data. Below, I summarize the basic theoretical framework
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of these auctions, focusing on risk-neutral bidders and bids based on private information
on their latent costs. (See Section 2.2 for Extensions). Assume we have N potential
competitive bidders bidding simultaneously for a project, which has value v for the
buyer. Bidder i’s private type is ci(i ∈ I), which is defined as his private cost of the
project.
Assumption 2.1: The bidders private types are i.i.d. distributed with Fc as CDF of
private type, and fc as corresponding pdf .
Bidder i proposes the bid bi based on his private cost without observing other bids;
the bidding rule is bi = σi(ci), where σi(·) is the optimal bidding strategy given any
private cost of the bidder i (ci). In the base model, we focus on the symmetric Bayes-
Nash equilibrium, so N potential bidders are using a common bidding role bi = σ(ci)
and bid independently.
After collecting bids, the buyer will score bids according to a scoring system si,
si = si(bi). To make the case simple, we assume si = bi. Thus, the optimal score is
min(si) = min(bi). The winning bid, w, is denoted as w = argmin(i ∈ I), si. Bidder i’s
expected revenue from bidding for a project is:
pii(bi, ci) = [R(bi)− ci] ∗ Pr{bi < bj for all j 6= i} (2.1)
where
Pr{bi < bj for all j 6= i} = Pr{bi < b1, bi < b2, . . . , bi < bN} =
∏
j 6=i
[1− Fcj (bi)] (2.2)
According to Assumption 2.1,
∏
j 6=i
[1− Fcj (bi)] = [1− Fc(bi)]N−1 (2.3)
Equation (2.1) is a classical First-price Sealed-bid auction result, where
R(bi) = bi (2.4)
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By bi = σ(ci), we have
ci(bi) = σ−1(bi) (2.5)
The optimal bidding strategy for bidder i in a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is as
follows. The F.O.C. (w.r.t. bi) of expected profit equation (2.1) is:
[1− Fc(σ−1(bi))]N−1+
[bi − ci](N − 1)[1− Fc(σ−1(bi))]N−2[−fc(σ−1(bi))]∂(σ
−1(bi))
∂(bi)
= 0 (2.6)
By Eq(2.5)
∂(σ−1(bi))
∂(bi)
=
1
σ′(ci)
(2.7)
Substituting Eqation(2.7) into Equation(2.6), I have
bi = ci +
σ
′
(ci)[1− Fc(σ−1(bi))]
(N − 1)fc(σ−1(bi)) (2.8)
From this result, we can see bids of any bidder i consists of two parts, the private cost
of completing the project, and the term σ
′
(ci)[1−Fc(σ−1(bi))]
(N−1)fc(σ−1(bi)) which can be interpreted as
the competitiveness of the auction.
Proposition 2.1: Given that all bidders’ strategic consideration is symmetric, the winner
at a First-Price Sealed-Bid procurement auction will be the bidder with the lowest cost
c(1:N) (or highest valuation if in an auction v(1:N)).
Proposition 2.2: There is no linear correlation between private cost c and bid b, because
of the competitiveness term σ
′
(ci)[1−Fc(σ−1(bi))]
(N−1)fc(σ−1(bi)) . For example, more bidders participating
in a procurement auction can drive the equilibrium bids lower (or higher if it is a seller
auction).
Proposition 2.2 is a very important characteristic of a FPSB auction. Compared to
other formats (e.g. English auctions, where the equilibrium bid reveals the private cost
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or valuation), this proposition reveals the phenomenon denoted the “winner’s curse”
which refers to the winner over-paying in some fashion. I discuss more on this issue in
Section 2.2.2. To summarize, I use this FPSB procurement auction model and adjust
it for my context, as I show in detail later (Chapters 3 and 4).
(3) Dutch auctions
It is believed that a Dutch auction format comes from the flower auctions in Am-
sterdam in the Netherlands. The price is set initially very high and then allowed to
drop continuously by a pre-set clock. Each potential bidder has an electronic device
with a button by which he can signal his bid price. When some bidder presses the
button, the clock stops, and that bidder wins the auction at the currently listed price.
Notice each bidder has to decide when to signal his or her willingness to pay based on
his or her private valuation, which is the equivalent decision in First-Price Sealed-Bid
auctions. It can be shown that given risk neutral bidders with private valuations, Dutch
auctions and First-Price Sealed-Bid auctions are strategically equivalent (Paarsch and
Hong, 2006). This result also holds for procurement auctions.
(4) Vickrey Auctions
Vickrey Auctions are named for William Vickrey’s contribution. Like the FPSB
auction, bidders present their bids in an envelope, but that the winner (highest bidder)
only pays for the first losing bid instead of their own bids. Vickrey auctions are most
visibly used in U.S. Treasury auctions. However, despite its attractive theoretical prop-
erties, Vickery auctions are rarely seen in industrial procurement (e.g., see Rothkopf et
al., 1990), so I do not discuss this format further.
2.1.2 Private-, Common- and Affiliated-Values
The information structure across the bidders determines who knows what and when,
and how the information influences bidder behaviors and payoffs. One can distinguish
three different information structures, each of which are elaborated below.
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(1) Private-Values Paradigm
Private-Values Paradigm (PVP, Independent Private-Values Paradigm, (IPVP) in
some papers), is defined as N bidders having an independent and identically distributed
value of an item (e.g., product in an auction, or project in a procurement auction). The
distribution of value can be written as Fv(v).
This is also the most commonly investigated paradigm. In most cases, one also
assumes the bidders are symmetric, i.e., they all follow the same distribution of the
valuation.
(2) Common-Value Paradigm
Common-Value Paradigm (CVP) is defined as an environment where the value of
the item is common knowledge to all bidders. Research under this paradigm include oil-
exploration auctions (e.g., Hendricks and Porter, 1988; Hendricks, Porter and Wilson,
1994; Hendricks, Pinkse and Porter, 2003), where the value of a specific oil block is the
same for all bidders. Bidding for items with a resale market commonly available to all
bidders is also reasonably viewed as CVP. Crucially, in a CVP environment, auctions
play no important allocation role, and the only explanation for heterogeneous bids from
different bidders in the same auction is individual opinions of the item’s true value.
Hence, as the number of bidders increases, the winning bid at a FPSB auction under
CVP will converge almost surely to the true value (Wilson, 1977). In the Empirical
Findings section, I review the issue of ascertaining from data whether the information
structure is IPVP or CVP.
(3) Affiliated-Values Paradigm
The Affiliated-Values Paradigm (AVP) lies between the IVP and CVP extremes, and
assumes the value of an item in an auction consists of a common value and a private
value. Although from a theory point of view this Affiliated-Value Paradigm includes
both an IPVP part and an CVP part and hence is richer, the technological disadvantage
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is also clear: models within this paradigm are often unidentified (Laffont and Vuong,
1996).
(4) Distinction between Private-Values and Common-Value Models
I borrow from Athey and Haile (2007) to summarize the essential theoretical differ-
ence between the PVP and CVP paradigms.Assume there are N risk neutral bidders
participating an auction, and let N−i denote the set of competitors faced by bidder i.
The valuation of bidder i ∈ {1, ..., N} (i.e., utility he would receive from the good by
winning the auction) is Ui, and U = (u1, u2, ..., uN ). Bidder i
′s private information
consists of a signal xi. Let X = (x1, x2, ..., xN ). This private signal is informative,
i.e., the expectation E[Ui|Xi = xi, X−i = x−i] strictly increases in xi for all realiza-
tions x−i of i′s opponents’ signals. Assume the set of bidders and the joint distribution
FX,U (;˙N) of bidders’ signals and valuations are common knowledge. The private val-
ues models and common value models can be distinguished based on the following rules:
Bidders have private values if E[Ui|X1 = x1, ...XN = xN ] = E[Ui|X1 = x1] for all
x1, ...xN and all i. Bidders have common values if E[Ui|X1 = x1, ...XN = xN ] strictly
increases in xj for all i, j, and xj .
In a common value model, each bidder i would update his beliefs about his valua-
tion Ui if he learned an opponent’s signal xj in addition to his own signal xi. The most
essential difference is that a bidder would like to know his competitor’s private infor-
mation only for strategic reasons; by contrast, in a common value model, knowledge of
opponents’ signals would alter a bidder’s expectation of his own valuation.
Foreshadowing my detailed discussion later, in this dissertation, I study IT Procure-
ment as FPSB auctions with PVP for two reasons. First, in my setting, the contractor’s
private cost is confidential and only observed by himself (bids are sealed in envelopes).
Second, these bidders only bid once for each project, and there is no secondary or resale
market for projects. Hence, there is no opportunity to “learn” about another firm’s
private costs, or to update “beliefs” of a bidder’s expectation of his valuation or cost
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within one auction. In this fast-moving industry, the different IT projects are quite
distinctive, so learning across auctions about other bidders is also limited.
2.2 Empirical Takeaways
I review the large, and growing empirical literature so as to isolate the gaps which I
intend to close with my work. As such, I discuss selected findings organized into the
following categories.:
• Independent versus Related Bidders
• Non-cooperative versus Collusive Bidders
• Symmetric versus Asymmetric Bidders
• Risk-Neutral versus Risk-averse Bidders
• Exogenous versus Endogenous Participation
• Static versus Dynamic Auctions
• Complete versus Incompletely Observed Bid Data
2.2.1 Independent versus Related Bidders
Recall that PVP bidders formulate their bids based on their independent, private valua-
tion of the project (or private cost in procurement auctions). However, as we saw , many
environments might exhibit some linkages between bidders; i.e., common value and in-
complete information at the same time. In many cases, this arises from the fact that
the auctioned good is not consumed immediately. As such, bidders may form correlated
expectations about the future states of the good. For example, in the oil-exploration
case, bidders form their expectations about the value of an oil tract from two sources, a
common value which is the same for all the bidders, and private information gleaned by
individual bidders from their own research. In other cases, these common values arise
from the presence of resale markets for the auctioned good. All the bidders’ valuations
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are endogenously determined and reflect anticipated profit from trading in the resale
market, which now implies common knowledge regarding the future value in the resale
market, as well as private information.
Can we tell from observational data whether an auction is PVP or CVP? Early at-
tempts (e.g., Paarsch 1991, 1992) use data from timber and tree planting auctions based
on the prediction that lower bids with larger numbers of bidders point to CVP envi-
ronments. However, this is not a dispositive test because as Laffont and Vuong (1996)
show, any CVP model is observationally equivalent to some PVP model. Relatedly,
Pinkse and Tan (2005) show that reduced-form tests generally cannot distinguish CVP
from IPVP models in First-Price auctions, because in equilibrium, strategic behavior
can cause bids to increase or decrease in the number of opponents under either paradigm.
Haile, Hong, and Shum (2003) reconsider this problem of detecting CVP by exploit-
ing binding reserve prices and variation in the number of bidders. Their tests were based
on the following distinction between a private values auction and a common value auc-
tion in terms of each bidder’s conditional expectation of the value of winning an auction:
in a private values auction the expectations are invariant to the number of opponents
each bidder faces, while with common values they are decreasing in the number of op-
ponents. Monte Carlo experiments showed these tests can perform well in samples of
moderate sizes. They also applied the test to U.S. forest service timber auctions and
consistently failed to find evidence of common values.
A related approach to this problem involves estimating the magnitude of the “win-
ner’s curse” which theoretically occurs only in CVP environments. Briefly, the winner’s
curse describes the winner as over-paying (or under-charging) on account of the need to
beat opponents with common values. Haile (2001) proved that when the bidders’ val-
uations are endogenously determined, a resale opportunity can change the equilibrium
bidding strategies. Hong and Shum (2002) empirically assessed the winner’s curse effect
employing a monotone quantile approach which facilitates the estimation of a model
incorporating both common and private value components.
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Applying this approach to data from New Jersey Transportation Department auc-
tions, they conclude that common values in bidders’ costs are evident. Bajari and
Hortac¸us (2003) examined E-bay auctions for coins to pin down an estimate of the win-
ner’s curse. Experimental data have also been brought to bear on this issue. Georganas
and Kagel (2011) conducted an experiment involving asymmetric bidders and found
that weak bidders bid more with resale, but not as much as the theory predicts. Fur-
thermore, bid distributions for weak and strong types are more similar with resale than
without resale.
Despite these empirical findings, it is important to reiterate that data are not suf-
ficient to distinguish PVP from CVP environments. As Pinkse and Tan (2005) show,
the underlying mechanisms used to detect and assess the winner’s curse, viz. the non-
monotonically increasing relationship between the equilibrium bid and the number of
bidders, can also occur in an affiliated private-value model where the winner’s curse is
absent. For my purposes, these findings reinforce the need to justify my PVP choice by
appealing to the institutional features of the environment rather than data patterns.
2.2.2 Non-cooperative versus Collusive Bidders
Many of the theoretical analyses emphasize non-cooperative bidders. However, given the
profitability and possibility of bid rigging, it is important to incorporate the possibility
of collusive behavior into both theoretical and empirical auction models. Unfortunately,
detecting collusion is non-trivial and depends highly on specific auction formats. Porter
and Zona (1993) developed a rank-based empirical test of bid rigging. Using highway
construction contracts from Long Island in the early 1980s, the authors developed evi-
dence of cartelization with a non-structural procedure. Porter and Zona (1999) extended
this method to study Ohio school milk markets and detected firm behavior consistent
with collusions (viz. complementary bids), and estimated the average collusive effect on
market prices as about 6.5%. Baldwin, Marshall and Richard (1997) examined timber
auctions in the Forest Service Sales Program, and found bidder collusion can better
explain the winning bids across their alternatives. Bajari and Ye (2003) extended the
approach to identify and test for bid rigging in highway procurement auctions. They
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proved that conditional independence and exchangeability are necessary and sufficient
conditions for a distribution of bids to be rationalized by competitive bidding, and re-
jected the hypothesis of collusive behavior in procurement auctions conducted in Upper
Midwestern states.
2.2.3 Symmetric versus Asymmetric Bidders
In the base model summarized previously, all the bidders are symmetric actors. How-
ever, it is quite straightforward to contend that bidders can differ from each other in
many ways. Three types of heterogeneity have been examined. I consider them in turn.
Observed Heterogeneity
When bidder-specific covariates are observable and vary across auctions, the distribution
of valuations of the good can be identified by controlling for these observed covariates.
This approach to control for heterogeneity has been adopted in many other types of
models, including the Roy model of labor supply (Heckman and Honore, 1990) and
competing risks models (Heckman and Honore, 1989. See Athey and Haile, 2007 for
more details). Bajari et al. (2014) proposed a semi-parametric auction model based on
this method. In this dissertation, I develop this method further by adopting the Campo
at al. (2003) method for my data as detailed later in the Estimation Section.
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Although the method in the previous section is straightforward, asymmetries between
bidders may vary across auctions due to factors that are common knowledge to bid-
ders, but which are unobserved by me. Here, identifying the distribution of valuation of
bidders can be very challenging and highly dependent on the data. Only recently has
this problem been addressed (and only partially). For example, Li and Zhang (2009)
developed a semi-parametric model in a First-Price auction and estimated the marginal
distribution of valuations using a Bayesian method after assuming a functional form for
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the unobserved heterogeneity.
Asymmetric Preferences
Aside from controlling for heterogeneity as summarized above, another way to under-
stand the asymmetric bidders is by assuming asymmetric distributions of valuations.
Assuming that entrant and incumbent in an auction follow different bidding rules, De
Silva, Dunne, and Kosmopoulou (2003) show that entrants bid more aggressively and
win auctions with significantly lower bids than do incumbents in road construction
projects. This method is especially useful in evaluating government policies favoring
certain bidders. Using California data from road construction auctions, where small
firms receive a 5% bid preference in auctions for projects using only state funds, but
no preferential treatment on projects using federal aid, Marion (2007) showed that pro-
curement costs are higher overall with these preferences. Larger firms lower their bids
while smaller firms increase bids. Based on these results, they attribute the higher
procurement costs to reduced participation by lower-cost large firms. Flamboard and
Perrigne (2006) also examined snow removal procurement auctions with asymmetric
types of bidders, and found very similar results.
2.2.4 Risk-Neutral versus Risk-Averse Bidders
Most empirical studies on auctions assume risk neutrality of bidders. Risk neutrality
is a natural assumption in settings with traded, profit maximizing firms. However, risk
aversion can become an issue when auctions involve high value goods, especially when
policy questions like optimal reserve price is the focus of study. For ascending auctions,
risk aversion has no effect on equilibrium bidding with private values, which suggests
that distinguishing risk aversion and hence identifying bidders’ preferences are impossi-
ble. For First-Price auctions, since bidding less aggressively leads to a lower likelihood of
winning the auction but higher profit conditional on winning, a more risk averse bidder
will be less willing to favor this result than a less risk averse bidder. Hence, in principle,
risk aversion can be identified but requires observation of all choices because bidding
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involves a gamble in this case. Since variations in bidders' valuations are private infor-
mation and cannot be observed by econometricians, preferences and the distribution of
valuations have to be identified separately relying on some type of observable exogenous
variations (Athey and Haile, 2007). For example, Bajari and Hortac¸su (2005) relied on
exogenous variations in the number of bidders for identification as it changes the equilib-
rium probability that each given bid wins and the choices (lotteries) available to bidders.
2.2.5 Exogenous versus Endogenous Participation
In the base model, there is no distinction between potential bidders and actual bidders,
and any proposed bid is valid because there is no binding reserve price. In practice,
participation in an auction is an endogenous decision of the bidder because of the fol-
lowing reasons:
• Binding reserve prices
• Costly information acquisition and entry
• Bidders’ uncertainty about the auction
Bajari and Hortac¸us (2003) examined a Second-Price Sealed-Bid auction with en-
dogenous entry to quantify the winner’s curse and entry cost. In more recent work, Li
and Zhang (2009) modeled both endogenous entry decisions and bidding strategies at
the same time in a First-Price Sealed-Bid auction, and quantified and compared entry
and competition effects in Texas transportation auctions.
2.2.6 Static versus Dynamic Auctions
Until very recently, almost all structural empirical auction models have considered static
models. Under this assumption, individual auctions are treated as independent games.
However, this assumption might not hold if there is a link between auctions. This can
result from learning-by-doing (in either the cost or valuation of a project), capacity
constraints or some other cause. There are two ways in which dynamics have been
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incorporated into auctions:
• Bidders’ valuation distribution in different auctions changes across time as a func-
tion of auction outcomes, which is observable by all bidders.
• Bidders’ behavior in one auction affects opponents’ beliefs about his valuation
distribution in future auctions, changing the equilibrium of the auction game in
each period.
The first type represents learning-by-doing. If a bidder wins an auction today, he
might have stochastically lower costs (higher valuations) in the future, or by partici-
pating in an auction, the bidders reveal their types in an incomplete information game.
Capacity constraints in procurement auctions also fall into this category. Both cases
can occur together in practice. By winning one auction, the bidder actually foregoes
the opportunity to participate in other auctions in the near future, but lowers the cost
of another auction in the far future.
There are very few empirical papers with dynamics in the structural model, with all
of them considering dynamics of the first type listed above. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer
(2003) investigated sequential auctions for highway construction and found that firms
with higher capacity constraints face higher latent costs. In Bajari and Hortac¸us (2003),
dynamics is considered in another way, viz. the format of endogenous entry decisions.
Zeithammer (2006) explicitly considered dynamics in a very different variable, viz. the
waiting times between auctions. Given forward-looking bidding behavior, waiting time
until the next auction of the same type increases bids, the same type offered in the
next five auctions decreases bids, and the impact of another offering in the new future
decreases with the number of intervening auctions.
2.2.7 Complete versus Incomplete Observed Bid Data
Almost all the existing empirical auction work has exploited the assumed observability
of all bids from each auction. However, it is quite common that the losing bids are not
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observed by the analyst, and sometimes not even by opponents. One typical example
is the Dutch auctions. Here, bidding ends as soon as the winner makes his bid, and
hence only the winning bid is observable. Another example is procurement auctions,
where the losing bids are actually observed only in very rare cases. Many procurement
projects are awarded through First-Price Sealed-Bid auctions; the bids are private infor-
mation to bidders and only the winning bid is published. According to Brendstrup and
Paarsch (2003), one approach is to treat a First-Price Sealed-Bid auction as equivalent
to a Dutch auction. Although the two auctions follow rather different rules, they are
strategically equivalent assuming the same information is observable prior to bidding.
In this dissertation, I consider my data to be generated by a First-Price Sealed-Bid
procurement auction with only winning bids observable. I am obliged to develop the
extant methodology further to accommodate the observability of winning bids only. I
do so both parametrically and non-parametrically, and discuss the need to do so later
in the dissertation.
2.3 Auctions as Incomplete Contracts
Although the winner of an auction executes work under a contract, the consequences
of costly, incomplete contracting are largely overlooked in the auction literature. Here,
I briefly survey the ramifications of incompleteness in contracts per se, and then recap
the single study on auctions that considers ex post revisions.
2.3.1 Contract Incompleteness
Although it is well accepted that real-world contracts are incomplete to some significant
degree, researchers have formed no consistent conclusions on the economic effects of
contractual incompleteness. There are two main streams of thought.
The first approach is Tirole (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988), who view contractual
incompleteness as the inability to commit to a division of the contractual surplus be-
fore making their non-contractible investment decisions. In this property rights stream,
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theory emphasizes residual control rights over assets, which determines the bargaining
power in the ex post determination of the surplus. In the modeling, the set of feasi-
ble outcomes is restricted through the imposition of limitations on the set of allowable
contracts (Tirole 1999). However, renegotiation of these incomplete contracts proceeds
costlessly, so the economic consequence is the distortion in ex ante investments.
The contrasting approach is Williamson’s (1985) verbally reasoned model, which
emphasizes the role of ex post opportunism and costly bargaining. Contracts set in un-
certain or complex environments are necessarily incomplete, thereby permitting parties
to engage in economically costly efforts to redistribute the surplus as uncovered contin-
gencies arise. Thus, in this latter approach, contracts are viewed as both costly to write
initially, as well as to revise subsequently.
Contract Forms and Ex Post Revisions
In the Williamsonian approach, different contract forms are presumed to have different
levels of revision costs; e.g., lump-sum contracts are harder to revise than are contracts
that specify mainly time and materials. The comparative analysis of alternative con-
tract forms in the transaction cost economics tradition relies crucially on the magnitude
of these revision costs. Based on observations that the procurement problem is pri-
marily one of ex post adaptations rather than ex ante screening, Bajari and Tadelis
(2001) developed a model where renegotiation costs affect the choice of initial contract
forms, viz. more complex products have a less complete design and are more likely to
be procured under cost plus contracts. As friction increases, the loss from inefficient
renegotiation of a fixed-price contract increases, making it less desirable.
Empirical work links several factors to contract choices including uncertainty (Crocker
and Masten 1991; Crocker and Reynolds, 1993), contract duration (Crocker and Reynolds
1993), contractors’ dispute history (Crocker and Reynolds 1993), and contractors’ rep-
utation (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000). However, the literature lacks any estimates of the
comparative size of these revision costs across fixed and flexible price formats.
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2.3.2 Ex Post Issues in Auctions
Put simply, auctions are contracts, so they must face the same incompleteness issues
reviewed above, but there is very limited literature on these issues. A few papers in
marketing and operations have examined on-line auctions following their popularity,
coincidently with the Internet boom at the turn of the century (see Jap, 2002; Haruvy
and Jap, 2012, for reviews) with companies like Freemarkets.com (later sold to Ariba)
promoting their use. These papers conclude that on-line procurement auctions met with
much less success than originally expected (e.g., see Engelbrech-Wiggans and Katok,
2006; Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Haruvy and Katok, 2007). Customized products are vir-
tually impossible to specify in sufficient detail ex ante; hence, the rigidity of auction
rules pose ex post adaptation problems.They suggest a hybrid form might do better by
combining an auction with a non-competitive award at the auction-determined price.
Similarly, auctions where the buyer retains the discretion to award the project to any
of the bidders might do better. Evidence from laboratory data and analytical models
are marshaled to support these hybrid mechanisms. From my perspective, this stream
of work supports my contention that ex post modifications need to be folded into the
analysis of procurement auctions. However, there is no work on estimating the under-
lying parameters of these non-traditional auctions, so my challenge is to develop an
appropriate methodology.
To my knowledge, there is a single study in the literature that develops and esti-
mates a formal auction model to accommodate ex post modifications. Bajari, Houghton
and Tadelis (2014) show that bidders incorporate rationally expected revisions into their
original bids. These authors study highway paving unit-price auctions that were invari-
ably renegotiated ex post with the winning contractor in the execution period. Using
unusually detailed data, including all the bids on each auction, as well as engineering
estimates of the scope of work, they developed an econometric methodology to show
that up to 15% of the winning bid price arises from the strategic response of bidders to
ex post modifications. The paper leaves us with two gaps:
• How do ex post revision costs differ across formats? Their methodology applies
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only to unit-price auctions, so comparisons between lump-sum and unit-price auc-
tions remain unresolved.
• Do ex post revisions skew bids (up or down)? Their methodology does not permit
one to ascertain the impact of the ex post revisions on the bids themselves; i.e.,
are the bids skewed upwards or downwards?
Below, I look at the broader literature on these two unresolved two issues: a) the
magnitude of comparative revision costs, and b) the impact of revisions on bids for
likely clues to their effects.
2.3.3 Payment Format and Comparative Revision Costs
The transactions cost literature (sometimes labeled the Coase-Williamson paradigm) is
related to this issue of comparative revision costs. Here, contracts are a means of estab-
lishing procedures for adapting exchange and resolving disputes rather than acting only
as incentive mechanisms (e.g., Crocker and Masten, 1991). Given the real resources lost
in maladaptation, the comparative contractual costs of adaptation are a central concern
in this literature. However, since these costs are unobserved, the empirical work focuses
on the observed consequences of choosing one type of agreement, e.g., a lump-sum, or
fixed price versus another type, e.g., a cost-plus arrangement.
As noted above, exogenous shocks (Crocker and Masten, 1991), contract dura-
tion (Crocker and Reynolds, 1993), contractor quarrelsomeness (Crocker and Reynolds,
1993), and a buyer’s reputation for good-faith dealing (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000) have
all been shown to correlate with the use of more flexible payment formats (including
cost-plus), and move away from fixed, lump-sum arrangements.
The underlying argument is that lump-sums are harder (costlier) to adjust ex post
so they are less useful in settings where adaptation to changing circumstances is more
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valuable. However, as noted above, the sole paper that structurally estimates a pro-
curement auction with ex post modification (Bajari et al. 2014) only employs data
from highway construction auctions that all employ an identical payment format (viz.,
a unit-price format specifying the price per unit of asphalt, labor, etc.), so the relative
merits of lump-sum versus other payment formats remain unresolved.
From my perspective, an empirical setting with multiple payment formats is nec-
essary to address this gap. In fact, the IT procurement auctions in this study feature
both lump-sum and other types of payments, so this is an advantage. I turn to this
institutional setting in Section 3.
2.3.4 Revision Effects on Initial Bids
Do rationally expected ex post revisions invite initial bids that are skewed upwards or
downwards? Both possibilities are considered in some prior work.
“Supplier Buying-In” Lowers Bids
Observers of industry practice have described suppliers of customized goods and services
who purposefully lower their bids to “buy-in” into future non-bid business. Once the
winner becomes the incumbent, she is in a better position to manage ex post modifica-
tions to her own advantage. In the public policy arena, this fragility of auctions to ex
post changes is the central theme of Williamson’s (1976) criticism of the Posner-Demsetz
suggestion of using franchise bidding (procurement auctions) to solve natural monopoly
problems in water, gas, electricity, and cable TV markets. Notice that while the original
bids are posited to be skewed downwards, these gains to the buyer are critical because
of the losses from the revisions.
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Buyer Opportunism Increases Bids
Based on the same transaction cost logic, the opposite argument is made in Ghosh and
John’s (2005) work on component procurement practices by original equipment manu-
facturers (OEMs). Realizing that their OEM-specific investments required to produce
customized components will leave them vulnerable to opportunistic OEMs during the
inevitable ex post revisions, suppliers protect themselves by initially negotiating more
favorable terms. Of course, these arguments do not necessarily extend to auctions with
competition between suppliers, but the broad implication is that bids are skewed up-
wards.
Unfortunately, these opposing effects are not distinguished in the extant literature.
While the Bajari et al. (2014) paper does offer an estimate of the magnitude of the
impact of ex post revisions on bids, the estimation methodology does not allow us to
distinguish the direction of the effect. These unresolved issues call for building a formal
model and estimation methodology that is flexible enough to accommodate either pos-
sibility (upward or downward pressure on bids), so that my estimates will allow me to
speak to the the direction and magnitude of the skew.
Chapter 3
Empirical Context
3.1 IT Procurement Market
I study procurement auctions in the Information Technology (IT) industry. The largest
data vendor in tis industry, IDC, collects detailed information on this industry, I have
access to 8,065 private sector IT procurement contracts signed between 1989 and 2013.
This is a very large, global industry with expenditures expected to reach $1,000 billion
in 2014, so this is a particularly appropriate industry to study procurement. Some of
the salient features of this industry are reported below.
High growth rates Over the last two decades, this industry has grown about 10%
annually (Caldwell and McGee 1997). Meta Group estimated in 2003 that 70 percent
of companies outsource and all companies would embrace the model by 2006 (Comput-
ing, 2003). Today, virtually every Fortune 500 company in the US and an increasing
number of companies throughout the world outsource some significant portion of their
IT services. Figure 3.1 shows the number of contracts signed worldwide every 5 years,
starting from 1989.
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Global Reach My data records the regions and countries where the work is deliv-
ered. For convenience, I recognize four macro markets or regions; Asia-Pacific, Americas,
Europe-MiddleEast-Africe (EMEA), and projects delivered globally. See Figure A.3 for
market share of projects from different macro markets. The growth patterns also show
some global variation. In the most mature market, North America, as buyers continue
to fuel growth, they seek to transition more IT work to annuity-managed service rela-
tionships for more predictability in IT costs. In newer regions like Asia-Pacific, Latin
America and Greater China, the growth rates are expected to outstrip the North Amer-
ican market.
Diverse Clients In my data, I observe 22,506 clients from 17 sectors1 engaged in IT
procurement: Government, Retail Trade, Communication & Media, Banking, Profes-
sional Services, Securities and Investment Services, Transportation, Process Manufac-
turing, Discrete Manufacturing, Consumer & Recreational Services, Wholesale, Utilities,
Resources Industries, Insurance, Construction, Healthcare Services, and Education. Ta-
ble A.1 summaries the distribution of the clients’ industries. As can be seen in the table,
the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as the biggest buyer in this market,
has signed 309 agreements, followed by the US Army (288 agreements), US Space and
Naval Warfare Systems Center Atlantic (SCC Atlantic, 287 agreements), US General
Services Administration (GSA, 270 agreements), and US Air Force (USAF, 245 agree-
ments). The ten largest buyers in this market are all government institutions.
I restrict my analyses to private sector clients because of various constraints im-
posed on public sector clients. The largest private sector client is Chunghwa Telecom
Co. Ltd. (CHT), a Taiwan-based company providing local and long distance phone
services, which has signed 85 agreements. However, most clients signed fewer than 5
projects (92.49%), as shown in Table A.1.
On average, the clients have 13,583 employees, and $7.92 billion dollars annual rev-
enue, with wide variation in both headcounts and revenues. See Table A.2 and Table
1 These IDC-classified sectors do not correspond to Census definitions
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A.3 for detailed information.
3.2 Characteristics of IT Procurement Projects
Scale and Scope IT procurement projects are multi-year work assignments. Among
all 49,072 projects in my data, an average transaction lasts for 39 months, with 32% ex-
ceeding 5 years. The average contract is worth $65 million, with 5,775 contracts (12%)
exceeding $100 million. The projects also have increased significantly in their scale of
work. In 2001, the largest outsourcing contract was valued at less than $100 million; in
2003, almost half were between $100 and $249 million (IDC, 2004; Halvey and Melby,
2005).
IDC categorizes the work content of these projects into 11 major types based on
four factors: duration, goals, deliverables, and activities. Table A.4 summarizes the
number of projects by engagement type, while Table A.5 summarizes the main differ-
ences between the various engagement types. In the recent past, trends such as business
process outsourcing, offshoring, internet-enabled outsourcing, and most of all the need
for globalization, have added new categories of engagement like Consulting, Education
and Training to the traditional categories like IT Outsourcing, Business Outsourcing
and System Integration. Many projects include work spread over multiple segments.
For example, a Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) project normally includes work in
HR and Finance & Accounting. My data vary considerably in the number of segments
reported (1 to 27 sub-segments). Among the 49,072 contracts in the sample, 8,622 of
them have more than 2 segments.
There are some tradeoffs between multiple segments and signing multiple contracts.
If there are too many segments, a single transaction becomes too complex so clients will
sign multiple transactions instead. Therefore, although it is common that a contract has
multiple segments, 99% of projects have 5 or fewer segments (8, 410 contracts, (17%)
have between 2 to 5 segments).
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Negotiations vs. Auctions A contractor is chosen in two distinct ways: negotia-
tions and auctions (competitive bidding). Among my observed contracts in force as of
2013, IDC recorded 30,590 (62.34%) as competitive bids, and 18,482 contracts (37.66%)
as awarded in a non-competitive fashion, i.e., through negotiations.
For contracts in force prior to the mid-2000s, negotiations and auctions were used
evenly. For contracts in force prior to 2006, more competitive bidding were used. In
the period up to 2013, around 70% of the new signed contracts each year were awarded
through competitive bidding. In what follows I denote an auction-based award of an
IT outsourcing contract as a “procurement auction.” In my analyses, I focus solely on
these auctions.
Conctractual incompleteness. To paraphrase Tirole (1999), incompleteness of con-
tracts arise from one or more of the following three ingredients: unforeseen contingencies
(parties cannot define ex ante all contingencies that may occur), costs of writing con-
tracts (even if one could foresee all contingencies, they might be so numerous that it
could be too costly to describe them in a contract), and costs of enforcing contracts
(courts must understand the terms of the contract and verify the contracted upon con-
tingencies and actions in order to enforce the contract). Snir and Hitt (2000) apply
similar criteria to conclude that outsourcing contracts are significantly incomplete. My
conclusion is similar.
Regardless of whether the project is awarded via an auction or negotiations, my IT
outsourcing contracts are likely to be highly incomplete in many respects on account
of the the technical and business complexities of the work, and the multi-year time
horizons documented above, which make it virtually impossible to foresee all contingen-
cies. Additionally, the customized nature of each project makes it very difficult, if not
impossible for third parties to verify performance.
Some sense of the pervasive incompleteness of these IT contracts is seen in one
surprising feature of these contracts. They almost never contain clauses specifying
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state-contingent incentive schemes. Instead, contracts contain the structure and guide-
lines for future adjustments. It is commonly believed that performance incentive clauses
are not enforceable. In my data, considering the 49,072 projects since 1989, only 160
projects included performance incentive clauses (i.e., 0.04% of fixed-price contracts and
1% of the remainder include incentive clauses). This is in stark contrast to many other
industries where savings-sharing, or performance bonuses, as well as other contingent
rewards are often included.
3.3 Stages of a Procurement Auction
Figure A.4 summarizes the timelines and major milestones of a large outsourced IT
project. The following points are worthy of emphasis. Procurement auctions do not
occur immediately after clients make the internal decision to proceed with a project.
There is a serious vendor pre-screening and qualification process. It takes about 12-18
months from initiation to signing for the typical contract in my data.
3.3.1 Request for Information
The first observable step consists of clients sending out a Request For Information (RFI)
to potential vendors to obtain information about their capabilities, finances, technology
resources, experience with the relevant technology, industry experience, their employ-
ees, recent rollouts, their customer base and references. Such a pre-screening process
accomplishes two things: it screens out the vendors who do not meet requirements, and
also shrinks the number of potential vendors to be examined even more intensively in
the next stage.
If the client elects to employ a competitive bidding process, it develops a Request
for Proposal (RFP) document which is described in Section 3.3.2. Competitive bidding
is the most preferred approach these days. (In my dataset, competitive bidding ac-
counts for more than 60% of all the projects from 1989 to 2013.) Competitive bidding
is preferred because it adds to project legitimacy, demonstrates high due diligence was
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performed, leads to lower competitive pricing and service levels, enables the customer to
use the possibility of other interested vendors as a negotiating tool, and provides access
to alternative solutions and technologies (Halvey and Melby 2005).
It should be noted that negotiations and auctions proceed quite differently following
the RFI. With negotiated deals, the client will first open negotiations with the most
attractive vendor, and proceed to the next one only if the parties cannot reach an agree-
ment. In the negotiations case, a formal RFP is not necessary.
3.3.2 RFP Process and Content
Scope of work. This is a technical description of the task and expected outcomes
(IDC Taxonomy, 2013). This is a costly and time-consuming process (which can usually
take several months), and clients often hire a third-party consulting firm to assist with
the creation of the RFP. Starting in the late 2000s, clients increasingly began to build
their own teams to design the scope of work due to cost considerations.
RFP Recipients. The RFP is sent to a very small sub-set of the original RFI contact
list. Inclusion in an RFP list is generally acknowledged by potential vendors as the most
important milestone. More than 6 vendors are almost never selected to receive an RFP,
with the vast majority of clients engaging between 2 and 5 potential vendors. Both the
client and potential vendors actively engage with each other at this phase. Even when
a vendor has an existing tie to a client, and client has been satisfied with past work, the
client will still include multiple vendors on their RFP list. Other than previous projects
with the clients, the size and reputation of both the clients and vendors also matters
at this stage. Plainly, with larger, high visibility clients, it is harder for a vendor to
break into the short list of firms that can receive an RFP; for larger vendors with good
reputations, it is relatively easier to be invited to bid through RFPs. Not surprisingly,
this process is highly expensive and time-consuming. Clients have to assemble primary
and secondary data on potential vendors, sometimes even refer information from prior
vendors, visit the vendors’ websites, and gather annual reports and industry surveys to
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form the short list receving RFPs. In my analysis, I also consider relevant information
of both the clients and vendors.
Completing the RFP. In the RFP, the client provides the background informa-
tion, services to be provided (a crucial step to writing the final Service Level Agree-
ments, SLA), how the performance will be evaluated, management procedures, change
order procedures, pricing structure, and termination conditions. Vendors are required
to complete the the RFPs to describe their proposed solution (technology, configu-
ration, committed resources, risks, etc.), their ability to deliver services (experience,
skill levels of staff, proposed schedules, physical and data security, compliance, disas-
ter recovery/business continuation, etc.), ability to implement new systems (technical
resources/ability, access to new technologies, flexibility, open system versus proprietary
systems, implementation schedules, remedies for failing to meet schedules, etc.), ability
to meet performance standards (methodology, proposed service levels, etc.), value-added
services (profit sharing, incentive mechanisms, cross-marketing, etc.), financial proposal
(pricing, cost savings, IT budget comparison, ability to increase or decrease services,
cost-of-living adjustments, taxes, payment schedule, etc.), human resources (number of
employees to be transitioned, salary, health benefits, bonuses, etc.).
Scoring the bid. The vendor will pay close attention to the scoring system described
in the RFP, particularly the distinction between “considered” issues and “for the record”
issues. The score is calculated based on the “considered” issues only.
To illustrate, consider an RFP to be used in an auction with a lump-sum (fixed-
price) bid. In such an RFP, bidders know that the total fee they propose in the bid will
be entered by the client into the auction; however, the number of people to be deployed,
and the hourly cost of each person is only included “for the record.”
On the other hand, consider a time-and-materials (flexible) RFP. With such an RFP,
vendors know that the number of people they propose to deploy and the quantity of
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materials they propose are important, but also that their price for each person and for
each unit of materials will be directly counted in the final bid score. On each scoring
element, each vendor is assigned a score. Thus, each vendor gets a final score weighted
by the factors begin being considered. The client discloses these weights in the RFP.
These weights and factors differ across the different projects in my data, but as I
discuss later in detail, the short listing process reduces the non-price differences between
the final few bidders. Figure A.5 summarizes the distribution of the number of bidders
for each project.
RFP recipients have to submit their completed RFPs by the denoted submission
date. The buyer will examine each completed bid package, score them, and announce
the winner. On occasion, there may be some revisions allowed to a completed bid, but
generally, the completed RFP is considered a final bid.
Ex-post Modifications. A striking feature of my contract data is the almost-universal
occurrence of ex post revisions negotiated with the contractor during execution. Of the
contracts in force as of December 2013, most are ongoing (and thus right-censored),
but I observed 1,717 contracts that had either been completed, or has been revised and
work was proceeding under the revised contract. Of these contracts, only 7.4% (129)
contracts were completed under the original, signed agreement without changes. In
another words, as far as I can see from contracts of which outcomes had been revealed,
the vast majority of them were modified.
In some respects, the modifications are not surprising. Earlier, I remarked that these
IT contracts were seriously incomplete, and the lack of incentive clauses hinted at the
pervasiveness of renegotiation.
The institutional setting lends weight to these issues. IT is a very dynamic industry
with ongoing changes in software and hardware. Technology and methodologies incor-
porated into the solution are often out of date before the completion of the project.
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For example, the recent rise of the mobile Web has forced the re-engineering of many
platforms and solutions mid-stream. Similar pressures come from the move to “cloud-
based” solutions. As one long-term industry observer at a consulting firm puts it “. . . IT
outsourcing contracts are simply a projection of future requirements, and renegotiations
are now seen as a normal adjustment to changing business conditions . . . ” (Steve Tup-
pen, Director, ISG).
The pervasiveness of modifications can be seen in the institutionalized responses.
Industry standard terms have been developed to describe and categorize modifications.
For example, the US Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) recognize seven categories
of modifications. In my contracts, the most common types of modifications involved a)
new work added to the scope of the original contract, and b) revisions to the delivery
terms.
These revisions involved costly efforts by both parties, with involvement from various
departments (e.g., finance, accounting, legal, business, IT, HR, PR, marketing) Vendors
have to summarize all the tasks completed, calculate all the costs to date, and propose
specific revisions. Clients have to evaluate the contractor’s performance to date, and
assess the net benefits to the proposed changes.
Once the engineering details have been agreed to, new financial terms have to be
worked out. Quite commonly, both parties will engage third parties to assist with this
process. In sum, it is a far cry form the costless bargaining envisioned in the property
rights tradition.
It is useful to recognize the costs of complete breakdowns. A notorious example is
the dispute between British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB) and its IT supplier, Electronic
Data Systems (EDS). In 2000, BSkyB hired EDS to build a £48 million customer re-
lationship management system (CRM). In 2002, BSkyB claimed EDS allegedly acted
“dishonestly” and misrepresented its capabilities, and claimed damages of £709 million.
While BSkyB claimed EDS failed to complete the task, EDS claimed that BSkyB did
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not have a clear idea of what it wanted from the system and that the constantly chang-
ing requirements of the customer were the cause of the delayed roll-out.
Following a breakdown in negotiations, BSkyB took the case to court in 2002. Eigh-
teen months later, the verdict was that EDS “failed to exercise reasonable skill and care
or conform to good industry practice,” and awarded BSkyB £318 million. BSkyB ended
up building the system itself at a cost of £265 million.
Breakdowns and legal actions may be rare, but “tough renegotiations and restructur-
ings will be a key future characteristic of outsourcing relationships” and renegotiation
and delivering more for less is the norm (Steve Ranger, 2013).
Chapter 4
Estimation Strategy
4.1 Model Setup
In this section, I describe a structural model capturing the contractors’ bidding behavior
of anticipating future receipts from contract modifications. There is some redundancy
with my earltier descriptions of the model setup in this chapter.
I follow the Bajari et al. (2014) setup with appropriate modifications as needed to
accommodate my observational structure. I approximate the procurement auctions in
my data as a First-Price Sealed-Bid auction. Assume we have N potential competitive
bidders bidding simultaneously for a project, which has value v for the buyer. Bidder
i′s private type is ci(i ∈ I), which is defined as his private cost of the project.
Assumption 4.1: The bidders' private types are i.i.d. distributed with Fc as CDF of
private type, and fc as corresponding pdf .
Bidder i enters a bid bi through the RFP based on his private cost without observing
other bidders’ bids; the bidding rule is bi = σi(ci). I rely on the symmetric Bayes-
Nash equilibrium, so all N bidders use a common bidding role bi = σˆi(ci) and bid
independently.
I model the buyer scoring the bids according to a scoring system si, si = si(bi). To
keep the case simple, I assume si = bi, and the optimal score is min(si) = min(bi).
So the winner’s bid w for the project is defined as w = mini∈Isi. Bidder i’s expected
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revenue is:
pii(bi, ci) = [R(bi)− ci] ∗ Pr{bi < bj for all j 6= i} (4.1)
where
Pr{bi < bj for all j 6= i} = Pr{bi < b1, bi < b2, . . . , bi < bN} =
∏
j 6=i
[1− Fcj (bi)] (4.2)
According to Assumption 4.1,
∏
j 6=i
[1− Fcj (bi)] = [1− Fc(bi)]N−1 (4.3)
Equation (4.1) is a classic First-Price Sealed-Bid auction result. Now I incorporate ex
post modifications as follows:
R(bi) = bi + τEi(Ai) (4.4)
A bidder’s total receipts from winning the contract consists of two parts, payment
under the original contract, i.e., the bid, bi, and some additional receipts from future
modifications Ei(Ai). Ai is an i.i.d. modification value of the current contracts awarded
to the incumbent contractor.
Assumption 4.2: The bidders are symmetric and rational in their expectation about ex
post revision and revision costs, i.e., Ei(Ai) = E(A) = A ∈ [−bi,+∞].
where τ describes how much of the modification amount, A, is folded into the bid, i.e.,
a discount factor.
I do not constrain either the sign or magnitude of τ . Indeed, there are important
differences for various regions of this parameter. Assuming positive gross receipts from
modifications, the range (0 < τ < 1) indicates that these gross receipts are discounted
to reflect both production costs of the revised work, and adjustment/negotiation costs
incurred by the bidder. In contrast, the range (τ > 1) is an implausible region. Finally,
(τ < 0) suggests that gross positive receipts from modifications yield a net reduction
to the bidder, presumably on account of very large production and adjustment costs
exceeding the modification receipts. A parallel set of implications can be drawn for
40
negative modification values.
By bi = σ(ci), I have:
ci(bi) = σ−1(bi) (4.5)
I solve for the optimal bidding strategy for bidder i in a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
as follows. The F.O.C. (w.r.t. bi) of the expected profit equation (4.1) is:
[1− Fc(σ−1(bi))]N−1 + [bi + τE(A)− ci]×
(N − 1)[1− Fc(σ−1(bi))]N−2[−fc(σ−1(bi))]∂(σ
−1(bi))
∂(bi)
= 0 (4.6)
By Eq(4.5)
∂(σ−1(bi))
∂(bi)
=
1
σ′(ci)
(4.7)
Substituting Eq(4.7) into Eq(4.6), I have
bi = ci − τE(A) + σ
′
(ci)[1− Fc(σ−1(bi))]
(N − 1)fc(σ−1(bi)) (4.8)
bi − ci = −τE(A) + σ
′
(ci)[1− Fc(σ−1(bi))]
(N − 1)fc(σ−1(bi)) (4.9)
The model yields two results that are quite subtle. Consider them in turn.
Modification Effect. As can be seen from Equation (8), the expected receipts from
modification contracts will affect the bidding price if τ ∗ E(A) 6= 0. Thus, for the con-
tracts where no new, revised contract is signed (29 contracts in my dataset, see details
in section 4.2), the bid is identical to a contract with no ext post revisions. For the re-
maining contracts, the direction of impact on bids depends on the sign of gross receipts
(A) and the size of the discount factor (τ). Since the vast majority of our data exhibit
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positive A, I discuss this setting in more detail.
Recall the latent cost, ci − τE(A), which I define as bidder i′s valuation of the
project. Equation (4.8) describes the bidder's optimal strategy: bid one’s latent cost
ci − τE(A) with a mark up of σ
′
(ci)[1−Fc(σ−1(bi))]
(N−1)fc(σ−1(bi)) . From Eq(4.8), if τ > 0, modifications
will lower the latent cost, and the bidders' optimal strategy is to lower their bids; if
τ < 0, modifications will increase the latent cost, and the bidders' optimal strategy is
to increase their bids.
The former result is congruent with an industry practice of suppliers labeled “buying-
in” behavior where they lower their bids knowing that changes will bring them more
money later. In our model, we see that bidders who expect net positive receipts from
positive modification receipts (net of additional production and adjustment costs), an-
ticipate that some of these future receipts are passed on to the buyer in the form of a
lower bid.
In contrast, the latter result reflects a situation where the net receipts from gross,
positive receipts (net of additional production and adjustment costs) are actually neg-
ative. Why? First, it is unlikely that pure adjustment costs are high enough to turn
gross positive receipts into net negative receipts. It is more likely that this reflects an
opportunistic buyer who presses for a lot of additional follow-on work at a very low
margin (perhaps at cost). Anticipating this, the bidder safeguards himself against such
buyers by increasing his bid.
Payment Format Effect. If τ is larger (smaller) for lump-sum auctions versus per-
unit price auctions, bidders will decrease (increase) their bids for that auction type
versus the other type, all else being equal. Recall the core assumption from the original
transaction cost literature (e.g., Williamson, 1976) that lump-sum payments are harder
to modify than more flexible payment schemes such as time and materials, or cost-plus.
My estimation allows me to test this assumption empirically because the contract type
is linked to the bids through the discount factor.
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4.2 Data and Variables
I have access to 8,065 private sector IT procurement contract auctions signed between
1989-2013. Each of these contracts was a new contract as distinguished from a modi-
fication of an existing contract. I tracked each of these contracts from the time it was
signed until Dec. 31, 2013, which was the cut-off date for my observational period. As
of this cut-off date, I observed outcomes for 360 of these contracts - the remainder were
right-censored. Below, I describe the available data about four aspects: i) the project,
ii) the client, iii) the vendor, and iv) the modifications, which are a crucial part of my
research question. Table A.6 summarizes sample statistics. Note that while some of
these characteristics are in the nature of raw data, some others are constructed mea-
sures. I point out how the measure was constructed if that is the case.
Project Characteristics
Size. As shown in Table A.6, the average contract was $135 million in value and lasted
69 months. Presumably, such large projects are important to buyers and contractors,
so we would expect extensive pre-screening. They are also quite complex, as evidenced
by their average length, and the large number of distinct business/technology segments.
I use ln(size) to control for the skewed distribution of this variable.
Complexity. I developed two measures of complexity from the data. First, I adapt
Susarla’s (2010) complexity measure based on three facets of the task at hand: a)
whether a task involves business transformation (i.e., objectives are defined in terms of
improvements in effectiveness; see Goo et al., 2004, Xia and Lee, 2004), b) whether a
task involves new system development (i.e., custom development of systems specific to
the company; Anderson and Dekker 2005, Gopal et al., 2003), and c) whether the task
requires access to specific expertise (i.e., when the contract specification mentions the
domain expertise which is essential for performing the task; Goo et al., 2004, DiRomuldo
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and Gurbaxani, 1998) or the specialized consulting services provided by the vendor
which draws on their specific expertise (Anderson and Dekker 2005). As summarized
in Chapter 3, IDC categorizes contracts into 15 mutually exclusive engagement types.
In this sample (360 procurement auctions with the outcome revealed), each contract
can be categorized into one of the 11 mutually exclusive engagement types (see Table
A.7 for details). Applying the Susarla approach, I use these classifications to develop a
3-level complexity score (see Table A.8 for scoring details).
My second measure of complexity was inspired by Bajari and Tadelis (2001) who
equate project complexity with the design intensity of the projects. I reason that the
number of discrete sub-segments in the project captures design intensity. A relatively
simple project is likely to include only one discrete segment of work (e.g., HR), while a
complex project inevitably includes multiple segments of work (e.g., HR and F&A). In
my data, projects range from one segment to 27 sub-segments, with most ranging from
1 to 5.
Uncertainty. Following Crocker and Reynolds (1993), I use the contract duration as
my uncertainty measure. Greater technological and business changes are present with
longer time horizons. Parenthetically, duration is likely to be correlated with complex-
ity, since complex projects should need more hours to complete.
Signing Regions. I control for institutional differences in contract execution with
dummy variables for the different signing regions, which is usually the country head-
quarters of the client. There are three large signing regions (Americas, EMEA, and
Asia Pacific), accounting for 180 countries globally. (See Figure A.6).
Number of Bidders. I observe the number of bidders submitting bids through the
RFP, but only the winning bid amount (and bidder’s identity) is recorded in the data.
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Client Characteristics
Experience. The cumulative ln(value) of prior projects undertaken by a specific client
as of the signing date of a specific project is my measure of the experience of the buying
firm with these auctions.
Size. I dichotomize the clients based on the number of employees to develop my
dummy variable size measure. We know that the buying process is heavily influenced
by the bureaucratization of a firm, which in turn is dependent on a threshold level of
employees. IDC categorizes clients into one of the following types based on the number
of employees: small firms (less than 10 employees), middle sized firms (11∼100 employ-
ees), large firms (101∼1000 employees), enterprises (1001∼ 5000 employees), and global
enterprises (more than 5000 employees). I borrow their categorization rule. (See Table
A.2 for details)
Vendor Characteristics
Prior Experience. Paralleling the client measure, I use the cumulative log(value) of
prior auctions won by the vendor as my measure of experience.
Prior Projects. A long-standing tenet of business-to-business marketers is that his-
tory matters. Indeed, much of the supposed downside of procurement auctions is the
damage to existing buyer-seller ties from requiring bidders to compete with each other
(e.g., Jap, 2002). Bidders with a previous relationship with the clients are likely to
behave differenetly in the auction because adjustment costs are likely lower, enabling
them to net a larger fraction of the same gross modification receipts. My measure is the
number of outsourcing projects between a specific customer-vendor pair that existed
before the signing date of the specific project.
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Modifications
I observe 360 contracts with an observed outcome. Each of these is coded into one of
five outcome categories: extended, expanded, extended and/or expanded, expired, and
cancelled (Table A.9). Of these, “expired” indicates that the work was completed under
the original contract. In all other cases, the original contract was replaced by a new
contract number on a specified date.
I categorize 360 contracts in my data into two categories: a) executed as-is ( “ex-
pired” and b) modified ex post. I further categorize modified contracts into the following
types of modifications: new work added, extensions and both. Of the 360 contracts with
observed outcomes, 331 were modified, while 29 were executed as-is.
Modification Value (A). To illustrate this variable, consider Washington Mutual
Inc.’s 10-year contract with IBM signed in 1996 for data center management, desktop
management, and network management for $533 million. The client’s rapid growth in
the next few years led to a revised contract in 1999 that expanded the scope of the
work. This new 10-year contract was worth $550 million and pushed the end date of
the contract to 2009.
I calculate the modification value as follows: the value of the new contract minus the
unpaid part of the original contract, i.e., $550 million- $533 million∗(1 − 30%) equals
$176.9 million. Figure A.7 describes the distribution of Modification Value; both nega-
tive and positive values can be seen, but most values are in the positive range.
Modification Ratio (A/w). This variable normalizes the modification value as fol-
lows: divide the Modification Value by the original contract value. In the example
above, this calculation yields 176.9/533 = 33.19%. The variable ranges from −0.1 to
almost 2.5. Figure A.8 describes the distribution of this variable.
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4.3 Multi-Attribute Scoring
I approximate the bidding process by a First-Price Sealed-Bid auction with a single
decision variable for each bidder, viz. i, the bid price bi. Recall, however, I described in
Chapter 3 that the RFP process included multiple dimensions along which the bids were
scored. For example, the RFPs typically specify many performance/quality dimensions
other than bidding price. Here, I provide my arguments for my approximation.
For the given attributes and weights denoted by the buyer, the game is a scoring
auction with independent private valuations. There are several papers on scoring auc-
tions in the literature (Che, 1993; Asker and Cantillon, 2008; Barjari et al., 2014). Two
factors are prominent in their setups and solutions: (i) how price enters the scoring
rule function, and (ii) whether private information is independently distributed across
suppliers.
In my context, according to the RFPs, price enters linearly into the scoring rule.
Similar examples include the “A+B bidding” (for example, A can be quality, and B
can be price) for highway construction work in the Unites States, where the govern-
ment provides estimated quantity of materials and weights (in highway construction
case, “A+B” stands for a general linear weighted summation function, and it can be
more than 2 dimensions), then evaluates the weighted costs submitted by the bidders.
In Che’s (1993) two-dimensional auction, where firms bid on both price and quality,
and the bidder devises a scoring rule, he finds that when price is entered linearly into
the scoring rule, the optimal scheme is implemented (when private information is one-
dimensional). Asker and Cantillon (2008) studied the properties of scoring auctions
in which price is entered linearly into the scoring rule but they extend the model into
a systematic analysis where suppliers’ private information is multidimensional. They
proved that the multidimensionality of suppliers’ private information can be reduced
to a single dimension (“pseudotype”) that is sufficient to characterize equilibrium out-
comes in these auctions. The most relevant finding in their paper is that the equilibrium
inherits properties of the corresponding standard IPV auction (existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium, efficiency). Based on these findings, I approximate the procedure of IT
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procurement auctions in my context assuming the following:
1. The scoring rule is a linear function of price and several other factors.
2. For each auction, all the bidders are provided the same information through RFPs
including clearly denoted dimensions and weight for each dimension in the scoring
rule. The only decision variables for the bidders are how much to bid for each
dimension listed.
3. Independent private costs of bidders are single-dimensional.
4. The buyer is able to commit to a scoring rule.
There are a few papers studying non-commitment scoring auctions. In this disser-
tation, I follow the commitment case. This is a reasonable approximation because, as
shown in Chapter 3, the scoring rule is publicly known to both buyers and all the bid-
ders. As for the non-commitment case, Che (1993) first proved that alternative scoring
rules (First-Scoring, Second-Scoring, and Second-Preferred Scoring) will yield the same
expected utility for the buyer (referred to a two-dimensional extension of the revenue
equivalence theorem). The lack of commitment power yields more-than-optimal quality.
There are two challenges in estimating scoring auctions: (1) identification of the
functional form for the costs, and (2) identification of the distribution of private infor-
mation (Asker and Cantillon, 2008). Empirically, estimation of scoring auction models
rests on observing the scoring rule and the bid information on each scored dimension.
Barjari et al. (2014) is an example. In their paper, the authors followed the above four
scoring rules: the scoring rule is a linear function of cost of all the materials which is
public information to all the bidders, the government provide weights and estimated
quantities, and the bidders only submit a bidding price for each dimension based on
their independent private costs. The estimation strategy relies on detailed information
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of the scoring rule (weights) and bidding prices of all the materials.
In this dissertation, I also follow the four rules above, and as I described in Chapter
3, the RFPs consist of both quality and price scores. However, I face additional chal-
lenges: (1) I do not observe either the weights of bids in the RFPs, (2) I do not have
access to bids on all the dimensions except the bidding price, and (3) I do not observe
the losing bids. Therefore, in my estimation, I make the following additional assumption:
Assumption 4.3: The observed winner of the scoring auction will be the same as if the
bidders had bid only on price.
Given this assumption, my approximation of the scoring auction as a single-dimension
auction in price is reasonable as summarized below:
1. In general, scoring auctions will change the optimal bidding strategies of single-
dimensional bids because the bidders can switch the bids between different dimensions
without changing the final score (and hence without changing the probability of winning
the auction). Che (1993) first proved that the equilibrium in the First-Score auction
(quasi-linear scoring rule where the winner is selected by the highest score and the con-
tract results from the score) is reduced to the equilibrium in the First-Price auction if
quality is fixed. Therefore, when quality is not fixed, this approximation is biased if
there is heterogeneity across bidders in the quality dimensions such as financial ability,
skills, previous experience, and reputation. I argue that on account of the extensive
qualification screening described earlier, only qualified bidders (only 2 to 5 bidders)
who are likely to be close on these quality dimensions are accepted, with price being
the principal remaining dimension.
2. I use only private sector procurement auctions. Here, the choice of employing an
auction is made by the buyer, not mandated by regulatory bodies as is often the case in
the public sector. Even after the RFI stage, the buyer may still opt to negotiate rather
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than set up an auction if the pre-screening reveals significant gaps between between
bidders in quality dimensions.
Some evidence of the price competitiveness of these auctions can be seen in win-loss
patterns across pairs of large bidders who appear repeatedly in my data. If firm A
were to repeatedly beat firm B across auctions, that would suggest that the auctions
are truly beauty contests in disguise, and are picking up significant unobserved quality
differences. For example, there are 121 projects involving both IBM and HP. HP beat
IBM on 52 projects, IBM beat HP on 32 projects, and they were both beat by some
other vendors on the other 37 projects. A similar pattern holds for competition between
AT&T-Verizon, CSC-IBM, and Microsoft-Unisys. Clearly, these auctions are price com-
petitive with the RFP process attenuating the non-price differences across bidders.
4.4 Parametric vs. Non-Parametric Estimation
The most crucial step is the estimation of the distribution of valuations of bidders, de-
noted as Fv(v). In Equation (1.8), I solved for the optimal bidding strategy in FPSB
auction as bi = ci + σ
′
(ci)[1−Fc(σ−1(bi))]
(N−1)fc(σ−1(bi)) . Note that this is an implicit function, where the
σ
′
(ci) is bidder i’s bidding strategy. Below, I summarize the pros and cons of taking a
parametric or nonparametric approach to this problem.
4.4.1 Parametric Estimation
The parametric approach assumes some functional form for the distribution of val-
uations, and recovers the parameters assuming the bids are Bayes-Nash equilibrium
(BNE) bids. Only a few distributions are tractable; three estimators proposed include
Piecewise Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE, Donald and Paarsch, 1996),
Simulated Nonlinear Least-Squares Estimator (SNLLS, Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong,
1995) based on the importance sampling technique, and Extreme-order, Generalized
Method-of-Moments Estimator (EGMME, Donald and Paarsch, 2002).
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Both MLE and EGMME have been criticized because of the numerical complexity
associated with the computation of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy and that
it is very difficult to implement on a computer. Thus, only very simple parametric
specifications of the latent distribution of private values have been entertained. For
this reason, only uniform distribution was used in Donald and Paarsch (1996). Instead,
SNLLS replaces the laborious calculation of definite intervals and inverse functions with
simulation based on importance sampling, which allows for more general parametric
specifications. Furthermore, SNLLS is the only parametric method that has been ap-
plied to First-Price Sealed-Bid auctions with only winning bids available. As such, I
employ SNLLS here.
4.4.2 Non-Parametric Estimation
The non-parametric strategy follows a quite different method: infusing no explicit as-
sumptions of functional forms, and instead, letting the data tell the econometricians
the distributions of the valuations. Therefore, although the bidding function itself is
unknown, its inverse function can be easily obtained empirically. This explicitly ex-
presses the relationship between the latent cost (valuations) and the observed bids. The
leading work is Guerre et al. (2000), which has been widely used in empirical struc-
tural estimation in auction models. In this dissertation, I also follow Guerre et al. (2000)
However, I have to extend his approach significantly to accommodate my data ob-
servability. Guerre et al. (2000) is developed for the base model described in section 4.1.
Fortunately, several extensions including observed heterogeneity in auctions (Li, Per-
rigne and Vuong, 2000), unobserved heterogeneity (Krasnokutskaya, 2011), asymmetric
bidders (Campo, Perrigne and Vuong, 2003; Flambard and Perrigne, 2006), random
reservation price (Li, Perrigne and Vuong, 2003) exist, so I am able to draw on these
advances.
51
Comparison
The strength of non-parametric estimation strategies is two-fold: (a) it does not involve
any explicit assumption about the functional form. so in this sense, it is more general
and hence robust to misspecification, and (b) it imposes a much smaller computational
burden because it does not involve solving differential equations or numerical integra-
tion.
The weakness of parametric strategies is very straightforward. All these parametric
methods, in general, have to make use of an explicitly expressed bidding function in
estimation. In addition, because all of these methods are based on BNE bidding func-
tions, the theory results cannot hold anymore when extending the models to incorporate
asymmetric bidders. Despite of all of these criticisms, for my purposes, one strength of
the parametric estimation is its ability to address what-if questions based on counter-
factuals or thought experiments.
4.4.3 Estimation
Considering the advantages and disadvantages of both methodologies, I conducted anal-
yses under both strategies in this dissertation, and introduced significant extensions in
each stream to fit my context and better answer my question.
In FPSB auctions, the bidders’ optimal strategy is determined by the baseline la-
tent cost adjusted by a markup. Lower latent costs lead to lower bids in equilibrium
(Jofre-Bonet and Pesendofer, 2003).
In the next section, I propose a method to recover the latent costs of each contract,
and quantify the effects transferred to bids. Donald and Paarsch (1996), Paarsch (1997)
and Laffont et al. (1995) have proposed parametric estimation methods that rely upon a
parametric specification of the bidders’ private value (latent cost) distribution. One big
limitation of these methods is that only very simple parametric specifications of the dis-
tribution of latent costs can be used due to the numerical complexity associated with the
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computation of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy. Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong
(2000) established the optimal rate of convergence for estimating the density of the la-
tent cost and constructed an estimator that attains this rate. This breakthrough has the
important feature that it requires neither parametric assumptions nor computations of
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy. There have been a number of recent papers in
this stream, extending the original model. For example, Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2003)
extended the strategy to incorporate random reserve prices. Krasnokutskaya (2011)
proposed a new framework to incorporate unobserved auction heterogeneity.
I follow the Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) procedure to obtain the latent
costs of contractors, and estimate the distribution of margins of auctions.1 Then I test
how three factors, [A(modifications),Type(per unit price contract =1),priorrelationship
(partners with prior relationship =1)], affect the margins to suggest some policy con-
clusions. The following steps are involved in my procedure
Step 1: Estimate the distribution of the winners’ bids: Optimal bidding strategy in
Symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (First Price Sealed Bid auction).
Remember that I only observe the winner’s bid for each auction. As proved in Athey
and Haile (2007) and Paarsch and Hong (2006), when only the winning bids are observ-
able instead of all bidders’ bids, the distribution of private values is non-parametrically
identified if the total number of bidders is observable. To incorporate this idea into my
estimation strategy, I follow the transformation of model (4.8):
Let FS(s) and fS(s) denote the CDF and PDF of bid s, and FW (w) andfW (w) the
CDF and PDF of the winning bid w. Under assumption 1 and 2, for each auction l
F lW (w) = F
l
S(w)
N l (4.10)
1 In Section 5, I provide the parametric results following Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995). Note
that both parametric and non-parametric approaches give me similar results, which is comforting from
a robustness standpoint.
53
f lW (w) =
1
N l
F lS(w)
N l (4.11)
Equation (4.9) can be rewritten as
wl(X l) + τAl − cl(X l) = N
l[1− Fw(wl|X l)
(N l − 1)fw(wl|X l) (4.12)
where
X l = [Cons,Complexity,Duration,Number of Segments, ClientSize,
ClientExp, V endorExp, Prior Relationship, Signing Region,MacroDelivery Region,
Customer Industry Dummies] (4.13)
Then
wl(X l)− [cl(X l)− τAl] = N
l[1− Fw(wl|X l)
(N l − 1)fw(wl|X l) (4.14)
Let
φl(X l, Al) = cl(X l)− τAl (4.15)
Then φl(X l, Al) can be seen as the latent costs which are the pseudo costs adjusted for
modifications A. Then Eq(4.13) can be written as:
wl(X l)− φl(X l, Al) = N
l[1− Fw(wl|X l)
(N l − 1)fw(wl|X l) (4.16)
Equation (4.15) is appealing in theory, but it is difficult to apply in a fully general
nonparametric estimation method, because the dimensionality of covariates is a prob-
lem. I solve this problem by using a homogenization process following Haile, Hong,
and Shum (2003). Define homogenized winner’s bid wHl = wl − Γˆ(X l), and assume
φl(X l, Al) = cl(X l) + Γ(X l), then Eq(4.15) can be written as
wl(X l)− φl(X l, Al) = N
l[1− Fˆw(wHl)
(N l − 1)fˆw(wHl)
(4.17)
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Haile, Hong, and Shum (2003) has proved that wHl is a consistent estimate of bidding
strategy wl = σ(cl), which is applied by Krasnokutskaya (2011) and Bajari et al. (2014).
Step 2: Recover the distribution of the latent costs of the contractors:
Step 2.1: The latent private cost for each contract l:
φˆl(X l, Al) = wl − N
l[1− Fˆw(wHl)
(N l − 1)fˆw(wHl)
(4.18)
Step 2.2: Trimming
Recover σ(X l, Fw, N
l) = wl − N l[1−Fˆw(wHl)
(N l−1)fˆw(wHl)
Apply the following trimming function to recover the latent cost cˆl:
φˆl = {
σ(X l, Fw, N
l) if σ(X l, Fw, N
l) ∈ [wmin + 0.5 ∗ h,wmax − 0.5 ∗ h]
Trimmed Otherwise
(4.19)
where h is the optimal bandwidth in Step 2.1
Among the 360 auctions in my dataset, 99 auctions were trimmed.
Step 3: Assess the effects on the latent costs from three factors (A , contract type, and
prior relationship), their interactions, and other control variables.
φl
wl
= α0 + [τ0 + τ1 ∗ I{Perunit Contract = 1}
+ τ2 ∗ I{Prior Relationship = 1}] ∗ A
l
wl
+ Control V ariables+ ηl
(4.20)
Chapter 5
Estimation Results
Table A.10 and A.11 describe the estimated values of the parameters from the non-
parametric procedure described in the previous chapter. Below, I offer some intuition
into the results, particularly as they relate to the bids.
Conclusion 5.1: τ0 is significantly negative (τ0 = −0.21) and less than 1; hence latent
costs are decreasing with positive modifications Al.
Recall that bids depend on the bidder’s latent cost in auction l. This latent cost can
be thought of as a baseline, based on which bidders adjust their bids using a markup.
The values of τ in Table 5.1 tell us that these latent costs are decreasing in Al; i.e.,
larger gross receipts from modifications induce more aggressive (lower) bids. Given the
characteristics of auction l, the bidders expect that their gross receipt will be wl from
the current contract, and E(Al) from future changes. The bidder's direct private cost
on the current project is cl(X l).
In a classic auction, without future modification (Al), the bidders will bid based on
their direct private cost cl(X l) (for example, production costs, management costs), and
a markup which is determined by the competitiveness of the bidding. When they take
the future receipt E(Al) into account, their gross receipt is actually higher, and they
are willing to sacrifice part of their receipt today. This is equivalent to the case where
their bidding baseline, i.e., their latent cost, is cl(X l, Al) = cl(X l)− τE(Al). Based on
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this new latent cost cl(X l, Al) = cl(X l)− τE(Al), instead of the direct cost cl(X l), they
follow the optimal bidding strategy wl = σ(cl) = cl(X l, Al) + σ
′
(cl)[1−Fc(cl)]
(N l−1)fc(cl) .
Conclusion 5.2: The coefficient of the interaction between the modification ratio and
type dummy (τ1 = −0.15) is significantly negative; hence, modification values under
lump-sum payment are discounted to a smaller degree than other payment types. Stated
differently, lump-sum payments reduce latent costs by a smaller amount than an equal
modification amount under unit-price payments.
The intuition is as follows. Recall that the previous literature (e.g., Banerjee and
Duflo, 2000; Corts, 2011) showed lump-sum payment contracts were correlated with
smaller adjustments because of their presumed higher adjustment costs. My results
provide empirical support for the underlying assumption: lump-sum payment contracts
are costlier to modify. In my model, higher adjustment costs leave a smaller fraction
of the gross receipts from positive modification being netted by the contractor, so their
drop in latent costs is smaller, leading to less aggressive bidding under lump-sum auc-
tions.
Conclusion 5.3: The coefficient of prior ties (τ2 = 0.17, p > 0.1) is positive, but not
significant; hence, a bidder’s prior work with a buyer has no meaningful effect on the
degree to which modifications are folded into the bid. While surprising at first glance,
a little reflection renders it less so. In my data, most pairs of vendors and clients have
either 0 or 1 prior project between them. The highest number of prior projects between
pairs is 2. Given this, it is not surprising that we find an insignifcant effect.
Chapter 6
Thought Experiments
Recall my first goal was to specify and estimate a more realistic model of procurement
auctions that accommodated the inevitable modifications during the execution phase.
My estimates and discussion above can be summarized as follows: positive modifications,
Al, lead to lower (more aggressive) bids. Below, I focus on the relative magnitude of
these lower bids under different circumstances. First, what is the magnitude of the
reduction in bids? Second, and relatedly, what is the effect of an additional dollar in
gross modification receipts on bids? Thirdly, what is the relative magnitude of these
effects on the two most common forms of auction payment formats: lump-sum bids and
unit-price bids?
Methodological Note: My nonparametric procedure reported in the previous chap-
ter comes at a cost. I cannot track the distribution of these costs from the observed
circumstances of interest. In order to address these questions, in this chapter, I extend
the approach discussed in Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995) to my setting where I only
observe the winning bids.
I assume that latent costs follow a log-normal distribution, and estimate the dis-
tribution parametrically. Based on the recovered distribution of latent cost from the
parametric estimation, I conduct 3 thought experiments (details described in sections
5.2-5.4).
Specifically, for each though experiment, I follow a 4-step strategy:
Step(1): Recover f(c) using the estimated parameters
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Step(2): Simulate S = 500 points from distribution f(c) given Xrecover and Xcounter
Step(3): Calculate wls
Step(4): Calculate wlrecover =
∑S
s=1w
l
srecover and w
l
counter =
∑S
s=1w
l
scounter
6.1 Parametric Estimation
I extend the Simulated Non-linear Least Square Estimator (SNLLS) discussed in Laffont,
Ossard and Vuong (1995). Recall that the bidder's optimal bidding strategy for each
auction l is:
wl = σ(cl) (6.1)
Then
σ(cl)− cl = 1− Fc(c
l)
(N l − 1)fc(cl)σ
′
(cl) (6.2)
Following the previous literature, I assume that the private cost cl(X l, Al) follows a
log-normal distribution for each auction. Let this distribution depend on auction char-
acteristics,
Xl = [lnT l, lnClientExpl, ClientSizel, lnV endorExpl, Complexityl, Typel, P riorl,
MacroRegionl]
where
lnT l: Log(duration in months) of original contract
lnClientExpl: Log (total dollar value of prior hosted projects) of clients
ClientSizesl: Dummy variables of clients’ sizes
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lnV endorExpl: Log (total dollar value of prior hosted projects) of vendors
Complexityl: [Number of sub-segments, 3-level Complexity Score]
Typel : {
0 Lump-sum Price Contract
1 Per-unit Price Contract
Priorl : {
0 No prior contracts between the pair before contract l is signed
1 At least one contract between the pair before contract l is signed
MacroRegionl: Region Dummy =[Americas, EMEA,Asia Pacific, Global],
and Al is the Modification Value.
Specifically, I assume that the mean of the logarithm of latent cost is a linear function
of the above variables:
Elogcl = µl = α0 + βX
l − τ A
l
wl
(6.3)
and the variance
γl2 = γ2 (6.4)
To make sure the interpretation of estimated parameter τ is consistent with theory
model (4.8), the sign of modification ratio A
l
wl
is negative. I use the Simulated Nonlinear
Least Square Estimator (SNLLS) to estimate θ = [α0 β τ γ
2].
Invoking the Milgrom and Weber (1982) revenue equivalence rule, wl = σ(cl) =
E(c(I−1)|c(I) = cl), where c(I−1) is the second-lowest cost, and c(I) is the lowest cost.
Hence,
E(wl) = ml(θ) = E[c(I−1)|c(I) = cl] =
∫
cl
. . .
∫
cl
u(I−1)fc(uI)du1 . . . duI (6.5)
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The SNLLS estimator minimizes QL(θ) =
1
L
L∑
l=1
(wl −ml(θ))2. Because ml(θ) is not
readily available, X¯l(θ) replaces ml(θ). Because X¯l(θ) is not a consistent estimator for
a fixed number of simulations S as L increases to infinity, I use the following simulated
NLLS objective function:
Q∗S,L(θ) =
1
L
L∑
l=1
[(wl − X¯l(θ))2 − 1
S(S − 1)
S∑
s=1
(Xsl(θ)− X¯l(θ))2] (6.6)
where
wl: winning bid for auction l;
Xsl(θ) = u
S
(I−1)l
fl(u
S
1l)···fl(uSIl)
gl(u
S
1l)···gl(uSIl)
;
X¯l(θ) =
1
S
∑S
s=1Xsl(θ);
S: simulation number;
I: number of bidders for each auction l;
Xsl(θ) is simulated following importance sampling, and I assume the function g()
follows a log normal distribution as follows:
E[g(cl)] = β
0 = w¯l (6.7)
V ar[g(cl)] = (
st(wl)
w¯l
)2 (6.8)
where st(wl) is the standard deviation from the sample.
Specifically, I follow six steps:
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(1). Simulate ULS∗I [L ∗ S ∗ I] matrix (L = 360, S = 300, I = N l), where for each
auction l = [1, . . . , L], ul(S ∗ I) ∼ g(cl);
(2). For each l = [1, . . . , L] and s = [1, . . . , S]
ulS(I−1) is the second-lowest number among [u
l
S1, . . . , u
l
SI ]
(3). For each auction l, given initial θ0, simulate [Xsl(θ
0)]
where Xsl(θ
0) = uS(I−1)l
fl(u
S
1l)···fl(uSIl)
gl(u
S
1l)···gl(uSIl)
(4). Calculate X¯l(θ
0) = 1S
∑S
s=1Xsl(θ
0)
(5). Form Q0S,L(θ
0) = 1L
∑L
l=1[(w
l − X¯l(θ0))2 − 1S(S−1)
∑S
s=1(Xsl(θ
0)− X¯l(θ0))2]
(6). Repeat (3) to (5), and
θ∗ = argminQ∗S,L(θ) =
1
L
∑L
l=1[(w
l − X¯l(θ))2 − 1S(S−1)
∑S
s=1(Xsl(θ)− X¯l(θ))2]
This optimization-based method is based on the “revenue-equivalence” theorem: in a
IPVP model, all auction formats will lead to the same revenue results (strategically
equivalent). Specifically, the winner (with the lowest bid) will bid exactly the valuation
of the bidder with second lowest bid (who also has the second lowest valuation). Table
A.12 reports the results of this procedure.
Conclusion 6.1: τ0 (0.17, p <0.01) is significantly positive ( ∂c
l
∂(Al/wl)
= −τ0 < 0), and
less than 1.0; hence latent costs are decreasing with positive modifications Al.
Conclusion 6.2: The significant positive coefficient for the interaction effect between
modification ratio and type dummy (0.32, p <0.01) means that modifications under
lump-sum payment auctions carry a smaller discount factor, and hence reduce latent
costs to a smaller degree than under unit-price payment auctions.
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These results are consistent with the corresponding conclusions from the non-parametric
estimation (Conclusions 5.1 and 5.2, respectively). The robustness of the estimates of
the underlying paramters strengthen the thought experiments below.
6.2 Thought Experiments
Experiment 1: What if the buyer were to commit to a no-modification policy at
the outset? The law requires some public sector buyers not to re-negotiate awarded
contracts, or at least puts severe restrictions on them.
I set all Alcounter to zero and keep X
l
recover= X
l
counter. Using my recovered param-
eters of the latent cost function f(c), I simulate the observed winner's bids (S = 500).
I measure winner's bids change by
∑S
s=1 w
l
scounter
−∑Ss=1 wlsrecover∑S
s=1 w
l
srecover
. I find that the winners
bids will go up by 27%.
This conveys an important bit of intuition. Buyers in fast-moving and complex
procurement settings inevitably find that their carefully drawn up contracts are seri-
ously incomplete during execution. However, instead of viewing this as an invitation
to engage in value-destroying costly adjustments that are to be avoided, my analysis
concludes that procurement auctions invite lower bids when the buyers accommodate
ex post revisions. Put differently, procurement auctions are not as fragile as Williamson
(1976) suggested in his critique of franchise bidding auctions. The marginal impact of
greater modifications shows this effect even more clearly, as seen below.
Experiment 2: What if the modification receipts go up by 1%? I calculate the change
in the winners' bids when the gross receipts from modifications increase 1% as follows.
I set all Alcounter = A
l
current ∗ (1 + 1%), and keepXlrecover = Xlcounter. Using the
recovered parameters from my latent cost function f(c), I simulate the winner's bids
(S = 500). I measure the bid change as
∑S
s=1 w
l
scounter
−∑Ss=1 wlsrecover∑S
s=1 w
l
srecover
. I find that the bid
63
goes down by 0.33% for a 1% increase in gross receipts from the modifications.
This reinforces Experiment 1 showing the benefit of modifications to the buyer. Not
only are modifications inducing lower bids, but larger modifications lower bids even
more. Buyers should embrace modifications, as I illustrate below.
Experiment 3: What if only lump-sum procurement auctions were used? I assem-
bled the 177 unit-price auctions in my data (Typel = 1, N = 177), and set the
Typelcounter to 0, and left the observed characteristics and modification amounts un-
changed, Xlrecover = X
l
counter, A
l
recover = A
l
counter. Using recovered parameters from my
latent cost function f(c), I simulate the winner's bids (S = 500) and measure the bid
change as
∑S
s=1 w
l
scounter
−∑Ss=1 wlsrecover∑S
s=1 w
l
srecover
. I find that the bids will go up by 16%.
This is a remarkable result. Intuitively, it would seem that the salience of a lump-
sum payment disciplines bidders and fosters greater competition among them. Some
industry observers note that bidders dislike lump-sum bids because of such effects.
However, my analysis demonstrates the gain from considering equilibrium behavior.
Bidders simply bid less aggressively when confronted with this payment format. Put
simply, when procurement auctions are used in a setting such as this industry where
modifications are inevitable, there is a significant advantage to using per-unit payment
formats over lump-sum payments. Table A.13 summarizes the takeaways of the three
thought experiments.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Discussion
Despite the growing prominence and scholarly interest in auctions, the evidence-to-
theory ratio regarding procurement auctions remains low. Marketing scholars and
transaction cost economists have often commented about the weaknesses of auctions
in procuring complex, customized services (e.g., Jap, 2002; Williamson, 1976). These
critiques center on the cost and consequences of the inevitable gaps in specifications
leading to ex post revisions that, in turn, undermine the competition-inducing benefits
of auctions. Nevertheless, we see auctions used all the more commonly to procure such
items. Unfortunately, ex post revisions to work scope and associated payments have
been almost completely ignored in the auction literature. In this study, I extend and
implement a method to estimate the direction and magnitude of the effect of ex post
revisions on the original bids. Data from a large set of IT procurement auctions show
results that speak to practice and scholarship.
I find conclusive evidence that buyers who accommodate ex post modifications face
much lower bids (by 27%, on average). These ex post revisions are sufficiently valuable
in that they overcome the adjustment costs of the negotiations and the added produc-
tion costs of the new work. These revisions are not trivial bargains since they are large
in relation to the original contract itself. The implications for practice are as follows.
When technological and economic circumstances make modifications inevitable (as
they are in this industry), far-sighted buyers and sellers accommodate these revisions,
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and this pays off. For instance, using payment formats other than lump-sum bids (e.g.,
time and materials or other unit-price formats) enhances these gains significantly. In-
sisting on a lump-sum format evokes bids that are 16% higher than unit-price bids
according to my calculations. This is evidence supporting the transaction cost assump-
tion that these formats are harder or costlier to revise.
This dissertation has contributions in both theory and methodology. First, it con-
tributes to the transaction cost literature by demonstrating that procurement auctions
for customized, complex projects can accomodate the inevitable revisions without los-
ing the gain from competition in the bidding phase. Buyers who accommodate ex post
modifications gain from aggressive buying-in bidding behavior, particularly with bidders
who have not been engaged previously. This finding helps to explain the widespread
use of auctions for procuring complex IT projects. Second, this is the first empirical
support of conjectures that two formats of contracts (lump-sum vs. flexible payments)
are different in their costs of modifications. Lastly, it contributes to the methodology on
structural estimation of formal auction models. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
first time structurally estimating a formal auction model incorporating ex post modifica-
tions non-parametrically and parametrically based only on winners' bids has been done.
The generalizability of my results stem largely from the data and context. While
marketing scholars have often focused on the hazards arising from opportunistic rene-
gotiation to exploit incomplete contracts, and the safeguarding costs to protect against
these actions (e.g., Ghosh and John, 2005), my IT projects feature significant prospec-
tive gains from incorporating new technology that emerges during execution. It may
well be that the latent costs are raised, not lowered by revisions undertaken in other, less
technologically complex settings. For instance, in the only other study on procurement
auctions with ex post revisions, Bajari et al. (2014) conclude from their estimates that
“ . . . because adaptation costs erode more than any positive gains from change orders,
firms increase their bids” (p. 1317).
How do we reconcile these opposing results? Highway construction is a much less
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technology-intensive environment, and new, cost-reducing or value-enhancing technolo-
gies are unlikely to become available during the execution phase. Most of the revisions
are the result of inadequate oversight or mis-estimation of the work itself, and the mod-
ification values of their highway projects are much smaller than those observed in my
data. In contrast, it is not credible to argue that adaptation costs could exceed the
multi-million dollar revision receipts observed in my data.
I close by noting that my methodology can be readily applied to either case. Recall
that I do not constrain τ in sign or magnitude. Cases where the goal of renegotiations
is to bargain over payments for work that has already been done but has been done
improperly according to the buyer are thus accommodated. The empirical effects are
likely to significantly change.
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Appendix A
Tables & Figures
Table A.1: Distribution of Client Industry
Client Industry N Clients in
Each Indus-
try
Agreements
Signed in
Each Indus-
try
Government 4,300 16,369
Retail Trade 926 1,392
Communication & Media 2,029 5,894
Banking 1,874 3,981
Professional Services 2,597 3,566
Securities and Investment Services 705 1,012
Transportation 1,201 2,618
Process Manufacturing 1,500 2,490
Discrete Manufacturing 1,538 2,626
Consumer & Recreational 814 1,188
Wholesale 769 1,008
Utilities 762 1,565
Resources Industries 279 506
Insurance 940 1,715
77
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Construction 262 346
Healthcare Services 1,092 1,517
Education 861 1,191
Others 27 34
79
Table A.2: Distribution of Client Employee Numbers
N Employee Numbers Freq. of Clients
Less than 10 Employees 191
11 ∼ 100 Employees 1,665
101 ∼ 1,000 Employees 5,595
1,001 ∼ 5,000 Employees 4,944
More than 5,000 Employees 4,624
80
Table A.3: Distribution of Client Revenues
Revenues Freq. of Clients
Less than 1 million 14,777
1 ∼ 5 million 14,595
5 ∼ 10 million 14,094
10 ∼ 50 million 13,681
50 ∼ 100 million 11,836
100 million ∼ 1 billion 10,614
1 ∼ 10 billion 5,074
More than 10 billion 1,268
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Table A.4: Engagement Types of Projects
Engagement Types Freq. of Projects
Systems Integration Engagement 18,169
IT Outsourcing Engagement 14,787
Business Outsourcing Engagement 6,282
Deploy and Support Engagement 4,969
Application Development Engage-
ment
1,452
Other Outsourcing Service Engage-
ment
1,281
IT Consulting Engagement 925
Business Consulting Engagement 604
IT Education and Training En-
gagement
233
Other Consulting Engagement 118
Other Services Engagement 107
Learning and Education Engage-
ment
97
Business Support Engagement 34
Contract Labor and Capacity En-
gagement
12
Production Coordination Engage-
ment
2
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Table A.5: Detailed Description of Engagement Types
Engagement
Types
Duration Goal Deliverables Activities
Systems
Integration
Engagement
Project based,
with defined
beginnings and
ends; once deliv-
ered, operations
of the system
typically cut over
to the customer’s
organization, and
the systems inte-
grator is under
no oblication to
conduct ongoing
operations
To create a
system of peo-
ple, processes,
and technol-
ogy designed
to address
customer’s
specific techni-
cal or business
needs
A system
meeting a
stated ob-
jective and
fulfilling pre-
determined
system spec-
ifications
IT site
preparation,
IT instal-
lation, IT
project man-
agement,
custom
software de-
velopment,
packaged
software
custmization
83
IT Outsourc-
ing Engage-
ment
Ongoing, with
contract terms
ranging any-
where from 1
year to more
than 10 years
To transfer
the respon-
sibility for
the ongoing
management
and execution
of an activity,
a process, or
a functional
area to an
external ser-
vice provider
to expand
efficiencies
and improve
performance
Provision
of ongoing
management
and opera-
tions to the
specifica-
tions defined
in the SLA
IT asset
manage-
ment, ad-
ministration
and op-
erations,
network
manage-
ment, and
related
archiving
and recovery
activities
84
Business
Outsourcing
Engagement
Ongoing, and
contract terms
may range any-
where from 1
year to more
than 10 years
To transfer
the responsi-
bility for the
ongoing man-
agement and
execution of
a business ac-
tivity, process,
or functional
area to an
external ser-
vice provider
to gain ef-
ficienties
and improve
performance
Provision
of ongoing
management
and opera-
tions to the
specifica-
tions defined
in SLA
HR, Logis-
tics, and
customer
care
Application
Development
Engagement
Short-term ar-
rangements that
contract labor
on an as-needed,
project, or on an
hourly basis
To deliver
customized
development
of software
applications
and interfaces,
and enhance-
ments to
existing pack-
aged applica-
tions or pre-
engineering
templates
Software
code, the
support
and main-
tainance
of custom
applica-
tions, trou-
bleshooting,
problem
isolation,
and instal-
lation of
patches and
workarounds
Includes but
not limited
to custom
software de-
velopment,
testing
and debug-
ging, re-
engineering,
and mainte-
nance
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IT Consult-
ing Engage-
ment
Project based,
with defined
beginnings and
endings; typically
under no further
obligation for
successful im-
plementation
or execution of
recommended
strategies and
plans.
To assist ex-
ecutives and
managers
with deci-
sion making
by provid-
ing objective
assessment,
analysis, and
advice
Analysis,
recommen-
dations,
advice,
plans, and
designs, in
the form
of written
reports, pre-
sentations,
and live
consultation
IT strategy,
operations
assessment,
IT design, IT
supplier as-
sessment, IT
maintenance
planning
Business
Consulting
Engagement
Project based,
with defined
beginning and
endings
To assist ex-
ecutives and
managers
with deci-
sion making
by provid-
ing objective
assessment,
analysis, and
advice
Analysis,
recommen-
dations,
advice,
plans, and
designs
Strategy
formulation,
process im-
provement,
change man-
agement,
benchmark-
ing, business
process re-
engineering,
and skills
assessment
86
IT Educa-
tion and
Training
Engagement
Incident based,
short term, long
term, or ongoing
To encompass
education to
enhance the
knowledge of
IT and expand
its use
A mix of
event-based
courses,
licenses,
or permis-
sions to use
self-paced
courseware,
etc.
Traning for
IS/technical
skills, desk-
top skills,
professional
IT certifi-
cation, IT
learning aug-
mentation
Learning and
Education
Engagement
Incident based,
short term, long
term, or ongoing
To enhance
the knowledge
of business
skills, pro-
cesses, or
organizational
competencies
in all areas
A mix of
event-based
courses,
licenses,
or permis-
sions to use
self-spaced
courseware;
the ongoing
management
of learning
activities
or an or-
ganization;
the develop-
ment of spe-
cific/customized
courses and
the creation
of education
plans
Traning
delivery,
professional
certification,
learning aug-
mentation
services, and
learning ad-
ministration
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Business
Support
Engagement
Ongoing or inci-
dent based
To provide
assistance,
information,
content, anal-
ysis, and
administra-
tion to enable
the proper
development
or ongoing
operation of
a business
process
Specialized
assistance,
telephone
and online
consultation
Varies
widely, de-
pending on
the business
process
Contract
Labor and
Capacity
Engagement
Short term, long
term, or indefi-
nite
To provide
work on an
as-needed
basis
Completion
of assigned
work to
the spec-
ifications
established
in the con-
tract
Associated
with con-
tract labor
and capacity
engagement
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Production
Coordi-
nation
Engagement
Varies in dura-
tion according to
the time required
to complete the
job or project
To transfer
the responsi-
bility for the
completion
of a specific
project to
a service
provider
Successful
comple-
tion of the
project to
the specifica-
tions of the
contract
Production
and coor-
dination
engagement,
varies widely
depend-
ing on the
industry,
functional
area, and the
nature of the
project
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Table A.6: Sample Statistics (with outcome)
Variable Cat-
egories
Variable Obs DescriptionMean Min Max Std.
Dev
Project
Characteristics
Start Year 360 Year
Projects
Start
2004 1994 2013 3.43
Duration
(Months)
360 Total
Length
of Con-
tracts
69.30 3 156 29.88
End Year
(Signed)
360 Year
Projects
End
2010 2000 2021 3.48
Modified
Year
360 Year
Modifi-
cations
Hap-
pened
2008 1997 2013 3.45
Total Value
($ Million)
360 Values
of Con-
tracts
135.39 4.8 640.2 152.32
Client
Characteristics
Client’ Size
267
Number
of Em-
ployees
of
Clients
10312 25 528458 61912
90
Clients’ Prior
Experience
Total
Dollars
of Prior
Projects
Held
In The
Past
By the
Same
Client
($ Mil-
lion)
424 0 24800 1740
Total
Number
of Prior
Projects
Held
In The
Past
By The
Same
Client
1.79 0 35 3.84
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Vendor
Characteristics
Vendors’ Prior
Experience
83
Total
Dollars
of Prior
Projects
Held
In The
Past
By the
Same
Vendor
($ Mil-
lion)
26600 0 242000 48000
Total
Number
of Prior
Projects
Held
In The
Past
By the
Same
Vendor
148.41 0 1783 228.65
92
Prior
Projects
301 Total
Number
of Prior
Projects
Between
the
Same
Pair of
Clients
and
Vendors
0.07 0 2 0.28
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Table A.7: Engagement Types in Sample
Engagement Types (In Sample) Freq.
IT Outsourcing Engagement 206
Systems Integration Engagement 17
Other Outsourcing Services En-
gagement
9
Business Consulting Engagement 0
Business Outsourcing Engagement 115
Deploy and Support Engagement 8
IT Consulting Engagement 1
IT Education and Training En-
gagement
0
Application Development Engage-
ment
3
Other Services Engagement 1
Business Support Engagement 0
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Table A.8: Complexity Levels
Complexity Score Standards
1
Involving business transformation
alone
Access to expertise alone
Involving new system development
alone
2
Involving business transformation
and access to expertise
Involving business transformation
and new systems development
Access to expertise and new sys-
tems development
3 All three involved
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Table A.9: Contract Outcomes
Categories of Outcomes Definition
Extension Contracts have been renewed and
extended under similar terms.
Expansion Contracts have been expanded in
scope.
Extension and Expansion Contracts have been extended and
expanded in scope. (Scope and
term of original contracts have
been significantly changed)
Expired Contracts have expired and not
been renewed.
Cancelled Contracts have been cancelled
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Table A.10: Nonparametric Estimation Results
Variables Parameters Coef (Std Err)
Al
wl
τ0
τ
-0.21 (0.09) **
Al
wl
∗ I{Per − unit Contract == 1} τ1 -0.15 (0.02) ***
Al
wl
∗ I{Prior Relationship == 1} τ2 0.17 (0.28)
Control Variables Included
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table A.11: Effects of Modifications for Different Con-
tracts and Contractor Types
Lump-sum Price Contract Per-unit Price Contract
No Prior Rela-
tionship
τ0 = −0.21 (N = 114) τ0 + τ1 = −0.36 (N = 125)
Prior Relation-
ship Exists
τ0 + τ2 = −0.04 (N = 7) τ0 + τ1 + τ2 = −0.19 (N = 15)
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Table A.12: Parametric Estimation Results
Variables Parameters Coef (Std Err)
Constant α0 -8.06 (0.99) ***
Contract Duration 1.78 (0.16) ***
Client’s Prior Experience 0.003 (0.02)
Client’s Size 0.64 (0.04) ***
Vendor’s Prior Experience β -0.02 (0.02)
Number of Sub-segments of
Projects
0.41 (0.04) ***
Project Complexity 0.90 (0.21) ***
Contract Type (Lump-sum vs.
Per-unit)
-0.75 (0.10) ***
Number of Prior Projects Between
Clients and Vendors
0.99 (0.27) ***
Modification Ratio τ0
τ
0.17 (0.01) ***
Contract Type * Modification Ra-
tio
τ1 0.32 (0.11) **
Prior Project * Modification Ratio τ2 0.33 (0.25)
γ 1.38 (0.06) ***
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table A.13: Thought Experiments
Thought Ex-
periment
Counterfactual
Question
Calculation Effect on Win-
ning Bids
Experiment
1
What if the buyer
commits to non-
modification
Acounter = 0 +27%
Experiment
2
What if the mod-
ification receipts
goes up by 1%
Acounter =
Acurrernt ∗ (1 +
1%)
−0.33%
Experiment
3
What if only
lump-sum pro-
curement auc-
tions were used
Typeper−unitprice =
1
+16%
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Figure A.1: Number of Projects Signed Across Time
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Figure A.2: Total Value of Projects Signed Across Time
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Figure A.3: Market Share of Projects from Different Macro Markets
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Figure A.4: Timeline and Procedures of IT Procurement Projects
Pre-screening Process 
Source: Halvey and Melby (2005), IDC (2013) 
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Figure A.5: Distribution on Number of Bidders for Each Project
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Figure A.6: Project Signing Regions
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Figure A.7: Distribution of Modification Values
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Figure A.8: Distribution of Modification Ratio
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